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Abstract: Popular television shows such as CSI portray
DNA evidence as the equivalent of a positive identification.
In reality, DNA matches are as significant as statistics tell
us they are. DNA match statistics are calculations that
describe the likelihood of a coincidental match between a
person suspected of crime and the DNA sample found at a
crime scene. These numbers are difficult for laypeople to
understand, and the methodology behind them is the subject
of scientific debate. One way to study the reliability of DNA
evidence is to examine criminal offender DNA databases.
These stores of genetic data are much larger than the
databases scientists have used to develop DNA statistics.
But offender DNA databases are secret, government
agencies use them to find suspects, and only their own
technicians have access to them.
Arguments in support of database secrecy do not
hold up. Government agencies are accustomed to handling
and disseminating all kinds of sensitive information about
individuals. This article examines three contexts in which
the government discloses sensitive information: public
records releases, court trials, and medical research. The
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most appropriate way of handling offenders' DNA profiles,
this article argues, is to follow practices prevalent in the
medical-research context. Government agencies routinely
collect DNA samples from newborn babies and share them
with medical researchers. If this system adequately
protects children's genetic information, it could also
safeguard criminal offenders' DNA profiles. If government
agencies do not allow scientists to test the assumptions
underlying DNA evidence, they risk violating the
constitutional rights of criminal defendants and
undermining the credibility of DNA typing as a forensic
method.
INTRODUCTION
Studies show that DNA evidence is particularly persuasive to
juries., It has a "special aura of certainty and mystic infallibility,"2 and
"may be so persuasive that its mere introduction in a criminal case is
sufficient to seriously impede defense challenges."3
DNA helped convict John Puckett of murder in 2008.4 The San
Francisco Police Department's crime lab had identified him by
searching California's offender DNA database, matching his DNA to a
trace of sperm left at a violent murder scene in 1972.5 Puckett, an
aging sex offender, argued that he did not kill anyone, that the DNA
match reflected a mistake or coincidence. 6 At his trial, a prosecution
witness told the jury that the chance of Puckett's DNA coincidentally
matching the true killer's sperm was one in 1.1 million.7 Puckett's
I Joel D. Lieberman et al., Gold Versus Platinum: Do Jurors Recognize the Superiority of
DNA Evidence Compared to Other Types ofForensic Evidence? 14 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y
& L. 27 (summarizing three studies examining the influence of DNA evidence on juries).
2d. at 52.
3Id. at 58.
4 Jason Felch & Maura Dolan, DNA: Genes as Evidence: The Odds ofJustice Can Be Long,
L.A. TIMES, May 4, 2008, at Al; Chris Smith, DNA's Identity Crisis, S.F. MAG., Sept.
2008, at 74.
5 Felch & Dolan, supra note 4; Smith, supra note 4.
6 Felch & Dolan, supra note 4.
7 Trial Transcript at 2165, People v. Puckett, No. SCN 201396 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 22,
2008) (Bonnie Cheng, a criminalist with the San Francisco Police Department Crime Lab,
testified that "the probability that a random unrelated individual by chance would possess
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defense expert, using a formula endorsed by the FBI and the National
Research Council, put the chance of a coincidental match at one in
three.8 The judge did not allow the jury to hear this number.9 Yet if it
is correct, San Francisco's crime lab would have had a better than
thirty percent chance of finding a match in the database regardless of
whether the killer's DNA profile was actually stored there.lo
the same DNA profile as that detected in the sperm fraction of the oral smear slide is
approximately one in 1.1 million for U.S. Caucasians."). Puckett's case is a good example of
how slippery these numbers can be for lawyers and jurors. Even though the prosecution's
witness characterized her rarity calculation accurately-as the chance of a coincidental
match between Puckett and the actual perpetrator-the prosecutor misapplied it during
closing argument. He contended that the denominator of the random match probability
(1.1 million) was equal to the number of people who must be tested in order to find another
matching profile. Id.at 3363. Thus of the approximately nine million white men in
California at the time of the murder, he argued that only 'eight to nine ... men ... look like
that crime scene profile and [Puckett] happened to be one of them." Id. at 3364. This is a
common "prosecutor's fallacy," and it "overstates the strength of the evidence because it
overestimates the number of people who must be tested before another match is likely to
be seen." RON C. MICHAELIS ET AL., A LITIGATOR'S GUIDE To DNA 98 (2008).
8Trial Transcript at 2833-34, People v. Puckett, No. SCN 201396 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 4,
2008) (Laurence D. Mueller, professor at UC Irvine, said that because Puckett was
identified through a database search, "the [correct] statistic would be about one in three.")
A couple of issues are worth noting here. First, the opposing experts' numbers are both
statistically defensible-they simply use different assumptions. MICHAELIS ET AL., supra
note 7, at 91 (explaining random match probability generally). How to figure out whether
their assumptions are correct is the heart of this article. Second, the defense expert made
his calculation by following the National Research Council's and FBI's recommendation for
modifying DNA statistics where a suspect is located through a database search. NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE 40, 134 (1996); FBI
DNA Advisory Board, Statistical and Population Genetics Issues Affecting the Evaluation
of the Frequency of Occurrence of DNA Profiles Calculated from Pertinent Population
Database(s), FORENSIC SCI. CoMM. Feb. 23, 2000, available at
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/backissu/july2ooo/dnastat.htm. This modification is
known as the NRC II formula, and in most cases, it is calculated by multiplying the random
match probability (the prosecutor's statistic) by the number of profiles in the database. Id.
Using NRC II, Mueller multiplied the prosecution's calculation-one in 1.1 million-by
300,000, which was the number of profiles California stored in its offender database at the
time. Smith, supra note 4, at 76.
9 Trial Transcript at 2852, People v. Puckett, No. SCN 201396 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 2008).
10 When San Francisco's crime lab hit on Puckett's profile, the California database
contained some 300,ooo DNA profiles. Smith, supra note 4, at 76. Today, California's
offender database contains more than 1 million profiles. FBI, CODIS-NDIS Statistics,
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/stats.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2010) [hereinafter CODIS
Statistics]. To calculate the chance of finding a match in today's database, the NRC II
formula must be adjusted because multiplying the random match probability (one in 1.1
million) by the size of the DNA database (i million) approaches one, or 100 percent. E-mail
from Laurence D. Mueller, Professor of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, Univ. of Cal.,
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Statistics are what make DNA evidence probative in court.'1 DNA
statistics describe the likelihood that a match between crime-scene
evidence and a potential perpetrator is coincidental.12 While these
statistics do not reflect the incidence of matching profiles in the
population, in most cases the lower the chance of a coincidental
match, the rarer the DNA profile.13 Just as a Social Security number
would be a poor identifier if many people shared the same one, a DNA
profile must be uncommon to be probative of guilt. Current DNA
statistics suggest that DNA profiles are rare, but scientists developed
those statistics from small population-genetics databases that
generally contain about looo people.'4 Scientists debate the
methodology behind DNA statistics, with many arguing that empirical
study of large numbers of DNA profiles is the best way to establish
whether the assumptions they rely upon are correct. 15
Puckett was 72 years old and living with his wife in a trailer park
eighty miles from San Francisco when police arrested him for the
decades-old murder of Diana Sylvester, a 22-year-old nurse.16
Irvine, to author (July 27, 2009 19:27 PST) (on file with author). The adjusted chance of
finding a coincidental match in today's database is roughly one in 1.6, or 65 percent. Id.
"1 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 40 F.3d 1o69, 1075 (ioth Cir. 1994) (noting that
"'statistical probabilities are basic to DNA analysis"); United States v. Coronado-Cervantes,
912 F. Supp. 497,o500 (D.N.M. 1996) (explaining that once a DNA match is made,
"IsItatistics must then be generated to give significance to the match"). See also Young v.
State, 879 A.2d 44,44-45 (2005) (holding that evidence of a DNA "match" is admissible
without statistics, but resting this holding on the fact that the DNA method analyzed
"sufficient locations to arrive at an infinitesimal random match probability").
12 MICHAELIS ET AL., supra note 7, at 91
13 E-mail from Ron Michaelis, Instructor, Dep't of Biology, W. Carolina Univ., to author
(May 3, 2010 11:37 PST) (on file with author).
14 See, e.g., Letter from Dan E. Krane, Professor of Biological Sciences, Wright State Univ.,
et al., to Christian Hassell, Dir., FBI Laboratory (Oct. 15, 2009) (on file with author).
15 See, e.g., D. E. Krane et al., TYme for DNA Disclosure, 326 SCIENCE 1361 (2009); Decl. of
Laurence D. Mueller, United States v. Berger, No. 2004 FEL 003420, at 5 (D.C. Super. Ct.
Oct. 22, 2006) [hereinafter Mueller Decl. II]; Decl. of Laurence D. Mueller, United States v.
Berger, No. 2004 FEL 003420, at 1 (D.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 6, 2oo6) [hereinafter Mueller
Decl. I]; Letter from Keith Devlin, People v. Ford, No. SCN 2151192 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 3,
20o8); Letter from Donald Kennedy, People v. Ford, No. SCN 2151192 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct.
3, 2008); Decl. of Montgomery Slatkin, People v. Ford, No. SCN 2151192 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Oct. 3, 2oo8); Letter from Dan E. Krane et al., supra note 14.
16 Felch & Dolan, supra note 4; Smith, supra note 4, at 72, 74.
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Sylvester died a few days before Christmas in her San Francisco
apartment, where she had been sexually assaulted, strangled, and
stabbed in the heart.17 Her landlord had seen the killer-she heard
noises and entered the apartment's open front door.'8 A man hustled
her out, growling, "Go away, we're making love."'9
The killer's identity remained a question for more than thirty
years. It might have stayed that way if not for forensic DNA
evidence,2o which was relatively weak in Puckett's case. The crime-
scene DNA sample came from the inside of Sylvester's mouth, which
meant it contained a mixture of the victim's and her killer's DNA. 2 1
Furthermore, the crime-scene sample had decayed such that fewer
than half of the typical thirteen DNA markers could be identified.22
The non-DNA evidence against Puckett was circumstantial: he had
lived in San Francisco at the time of the murder, committed several
sex offenses there five years later, and been referred for employment
17 Felch & Dolan, supra note 4; Smith, supra note 4, at 72.
18 Smith, supra note 4, at 72.
19 Id.
20 See Press Release, S.F. Police Dep't, Arrest Through DNA Analysis in 33-Year-Old
Homicide Case (Apr. 21, 2oo6), available at http://sf-police.org/index.aspx?page=2113.
21 Smith, supra note 4, at 8o; Trial Transcript at 2125, People v. Puckett, No. SCN 201396
(Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 22, 20o8). The significance of DNA mixtures is controversial. Bonnie
Cheng, a criminalist at the San Francisco Police Departiment Crime Lab, testified in
Puckett's case that a simple process separates sperm cells from non-sperm cells before
profiling each. Id. at 2116. However, she also testified that it's fairly common for the
separation to be incomplete, leaving DNA technicians, and ultimately juries, to guess which
profiled DNA markers belong to the killer and which belong to the victim. Id. at 2121. No
established protocol exists for how to interpret DNA mixtures, and Peter Gill, a British
researcher who administers Britain's national DNA database, told a forensic science
conference in 2005 that "[i]f you show lo colleagues a mixture, you will probably end up
with 1o different answers." Smith, supra note 4, at 8o. In Puckett's case, some of the DNA
attributed to the killer could have been Sylvester's, leading police to look for a DNA profile
in the database that was not necessarily consistent with the killer's DNA profile. See Trial
Transcript at 2212, People v. Puckett, No. SCN 201396 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 22,2008).
22 Felch & Dolan, supra note 4; Smith, supra note 4. In another DNA case in Illinois, the
state database administrator testified in a deposition that "[ilfit doesn't match across the
thirteen [markers], then it's not a true match." People v. Wright, Nos. 1-07-3106, 1-07-
3464, 2010 WL 1194903, at *8 (Ill. App. Ct. Mar. 26, 2010) (referring to a deposition taken
in connection with People v. Luna, No. 02 CR 15430 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2oo6)). Puckett matched
the crime-scene sample at five-and-a-half markers. Felch & Dolan, supra note 4; Smith,
supra note 4.
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to the University of California, San Francisco, where the victim
worked as a nurse. 2 3 After the trial, jurors said it was the DNA-and
particularly the prosecution's statistic-that convinced them Puckett
was guilty.24
These seemingly irreconcilable statistics offered by opposing
experts in the Puckett trial highlight one of the reasons scientists urge
empirical study of DNA profiles-they question the role DNA
databases play in increasing the likelihood of coincidental matches.25
In Puckett's case, the prosecution told the jury that the chance of a
coincidental match was one in 1.1 million, and the defense countered
with one in three.26 It did not come up at trial, but a third school of
scientists would say the prosecution's statistic was too conservative-
in their view, the odds would be longer that Puckett coincidentally
matched Sylvester's killer because running a database search rules out
thousands of potential suspects. 2 7  Interestingly, these conflicting
views-one insisting that a database search makes a false match more
likely, and the other contending it does the exact opposite-"rest
solidly on valid mathematical principles."28 Both are correct,
mathematically speaking.29
23 Trial Transcript at 3365-69, People v. Puckett, No. SCN 201396 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 13,
2008); Felch & Dolan, supra note 4.
24 Felch & Dolan, supra note 4. "I don't think we'd be here if it wasn't for the DNA," a juror
told the Los Angeles Times. Id. When asked if the defense's one in three statistic would
have affected his decision, he said, "Of course it would have changed things." Id.
25 See, e.g., Mueller Decl. I, supra note 15.
26 For an explanation of how each side reached its statistic, see supra note 8.
27 See Peter Donnelly & Richard D. Friedman, DNA Database Searches and the Legal
Consumption ofScientific Evidence, 97 MICH. L. REV. 931, 931, 945 (1998-1999) (arguing
that finding a DNA match within a database is slightly more probative than a random non-
database match because it eliminates as potential suspects the many people within the
database whose DNA profiles do not match the crime-scene evidence).
28 MICHAELIS ET AL., supra note 7, at 127; see also FBI DNA Advisory Board, supra note 8
("Both camps appear to present rigorous arguments to support their positions. Indeed the
proper treatment superficially appears to rest in the details of arcane mathematics.")
29 That the scientific community could entertain diametrically opposing views "seems
surprising [to laypeople], but in fact in the history of mathematics, and in particular the
history of probability theory, there have been several cases where it took some time before
a consensus emerged as to what calculation was appropriate in a particular situation."
Letter from Keith Devlin, supra note 15-
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While conflicting truths and questionable assumptions are
tolerable in the abstract, they become troubling in a criminal justice
system that operates on reasonable doubt. The statistical and genetic
questions raised by Puckett's case and others cast doubt upon the
probative value of all DNA matches, whether or not they involve
databases.3o A way to find out the true significance of a DNA match,
some scientists say, is to study the contents of offender databases,
which contain far more profiles than any database previously
studied.31 However, these databases are largely secret. Government
agencies search them to find suspects and regard all other uses to be
illegal. Using these and other arguments, government lawyers often
persuade judges to deny outsiders access to the contents of DNA
databases.32 This article evaluates the arguments for and against
30 The effect of a database search on the likelihood of finding a DNA match is just one
question raised by the use of forensic DNA evidence. Another concern is that DNA
statistics might incorrectly assume that all DNA markers are independent, discounting the
possibility that certain combinations of markers might be more common than others.
Laurence D. Mueller, Can Simple Population Genetic Models Reconcile Partial Match
Frequencies Observed in Large Forensic Databases?, 87 J. GENETICS 101, 107 (2008).
Others can be found infr-a notes 91-94 and surrounding text.
31E.g., Letter from Dan E. Krane et al., supra note 14 (sixteen academics asking for access
to the national DNA database due to concern about the accuracy of DNA rarity statistics).
32 See United States v. Blackmon, No. 2008 CF1 21355 (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 23, 2009)
(Alprin, J.); United States v. Berger, No. F-3420-04 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 14, 20o6)
(Satterfield, J.); United States v. Jacobs, No. F-320-oo (D.C. Super. Ct, Feb. 7, 2006)
(Reid-Winston, J.); United States v. Rue, No. F-3817-05 (D.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 29, 2005)
(Christian, J.); People v. Ford, No. SCN 2151192 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 29, 2oo8); Notice of
Objection and Motion to Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum, People v. Ford, No. SCN 2151192,
at 2, fn.1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 5, 2008) [hereinafter Ford Motion to Quash] (citing Davis v.
Super. Ct., No. A116603 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2007); People v. Brown, No. CC643081 (Cal.
Super. Ct. July 11, 20o8); People v. Davis, No. SCN 190226 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 21, 2oo6)
(Morgan, J.); People v. Perryman, No. SCN 198604 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 16, 2006); People
v. Smith, No. BA 255390 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 26, 2oo6); People v. Ardoin, No. 196690-3
(Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 20, 2006); People v. Hill, No. KA o64034 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 24,
2005)). But see People v. Wright, Nos. 1-07-3106, 1-07-3464, 2010 WL 1194903 (Ill. App.
Ct. Mar. 26, 2010) (unanimous appellate panel ordered new trial for defendant denied
search of DNA profile matches within Illinois's database); People v. Luna, No. 02 CR 15430
(Ill. Cir. Ct. 2oo6) (judge ordered search for DNA profile matches within Illinois's
database); State v. Davis, No. CT 05-0024X (Md. Cir. Ct. Aug. 4, 2oo6) (Platt, J.) (judge
ordered search for DNA profile matches within Maryland's database); E-mails from Steve
Jacobson, Attorney, to author (Mar. 12, 2010 11:19 & 14:48 PST) (on file with author)
(referring to a 1999 order in People v. Shreck, No. 98 CR 2475, in Boulder, Colorado, in
which Judge Daniel Hale ordered Colorado to make the contents of its offender database
available to Steve Jacobson, Shreck's attorney; at the time, the database contained 5,629
profiles).
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database secrecy. It explores ways of making offender DNA databases
available without compromising the sensitive data they contain and
concludes that independent scientific researchers should be allowed to
study them.
This proposal is modest.33 A more radical one would ask the
government to hand over offenders' DNA samples rather than
profiles.34 DNA samples are the biological material itself, while DNA
profiles are twenty-six-number35 sequences that derive from DNA
samples and correspond to a tiny portion of the full human genome.36
A study of DNA samples would let researchers check the work of
government laboratories, a task past experience suggests is
33 It is also gaining traction among criminology scholars. William C. Thompson, professor
and chair of the Department of Criminology, Law & Society at the University of California,
Irvine, writes that "there is no persuasive justification for the government's insistence on
maintaining the secrecy of database profiles, so long as the identity of the contributors is
not disclosed." William C. Thompson, The Potentialfor Error in Forensic DNA Testing, 21
GENEWATCH 5, 8 (2008). Likewise, Professor David Kaye writes that "the government
should make an anonymized version of [the national database] available to all researchers.
The ultimate outcome ... will be greater confidence in the method now used.. .,or it will
be some revised, but more defensible form of these estimates." David H. Kaye, DNA
Database Woes: What is the FBI Afraid Of? 31-32 (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
34 DNA sample research is underway in the private sector, as companies capitalize upon
people's desire to unlock the secrets of their DNA. Spitting Parties: The Fashionable
Approach to Genetic Risk?, LAB TIMES ONLINE, Oct. 1, 2oo8, http://www.lab-
times.org/editorial/e-o78.html. Companies such as 23andMe encourage customers to host
"Spit Parties," in which guests submit a saliva sample for analysis. Id. Rupert Murdoch and
Harvey Weinstein are "[k]nown spitters." Id. They and other "[c]ustomers cannot opt out
of having their information anonymously shared, but they can refuse to participate in
surveys focusing on specific traits." Id. People that seek out these tests tend to be wealthy
and might not worry about genetic discrimination in health care and other areas.
However, the fact that people surrender their entire genome to private companies suggests
that fears about the misuse of forensic DNA profiles are overblown.
35 Law enforcement agencies once used fewer numbers, and some use more, but the FBI
has settled on twenty-six as standard. BRUCE BUDOWLE ET AL., CODIS AND PCR-BASED
SHORT TANDEM REPEAT LOci: LAw ENFORCEMENT TOOLS 76 (1998), available at
http://www.promega.com/geneticidproc/eusymp2proc/17.pdf Twenty-six numbers
correspond with thirteen DNA markers, each of which contain two alleles.
36 See MICHAELIS ET AL., supra note 7, at 11-12, 16. Forensic testing focuses on portions of
the genome known as "benign polymorphisms," which seem to have no impact on the
function of a gene's proteins and therefore no impact on human health. Id. at 11. Portions
of the genome known to affect genes' proteins-"functional polymorphisms"-"play critical
roles in our development and function" and have been linked to diseases such as cancer,
Alzheimer's disease, diabetes, asthma, and cardiovascular disease. Id. at 11-12.
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warranted.37 For example, an FBI DNA lab analyst, Jacqueline Blake,
pled guilty to falsifying her laboratory's quality assurance reports.38
An audit of a Massachusetts crime lab uncovered faulty DNA test
results and instances in which someone had mistakenly entered the
same genetic profile for two individuals.39 And the crime lab that
identified Puckett was faulted for substandard cleanliness and
inadequate chain-of-custody records.40 These and other laboratory
failures reveal the vulnerabilities inherent in our system of collecting,
identifying, and analyzing DNA samples.41 The study of offenders'
DNA samples would be a check against systemic problems and
"horrific tales of false-positive DNA matches," which touch some of
the nation's premier DNA laboratories.42 Furthermore, the release of
DNA samples would let researchers develop a clean database of DNA
profiles for population-genetics research-a purpose for which
government scientists say existing profile databases are ill-suited.43
Yet DNA samples are revealing. They contain entire genomes, and
they might reveal the genetic predispositions of a given offender
population. Profiles, on the other hand, are strings of digits. They
represent a portion of the genome known as "junk DNA"-so-named
because they are not believed to code for characteristics. In the digital
37 See Erin Murphy, The New Forensics: Criminal Justice, False Certainty, and the Second
Generation of Scientific Evidence, 95 CAL. L. REV. 721, 773 (2007). False positives can
result from contamination and poor quality control, such as improper use of gloves or
"squeezing a pipette into the wrong tube." Id. at 754. DNA is also potentially vulnerable to
misuse "by rogue police officers doggedly committed to obtaining convictions." Troy
Duster, Explaining Differential Trust of DNA Forensic Technology: Grounded Assessment
or Inexplicable Paranoia? 34 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 293, 294 (2006). "Among the first 200
people exonerated by post-conviction DNA testing were two men ... who were convicted in
the first place due partly to DNA testing errors." Thompson, supra note 33, at 7.
38 Murphy, supra note 37.
39 Id.
40 Am. Soc. Of Crime Laboratory Dirs., Inspection Report 5, 20 (Nov. 2009). A San Francisco
crime lab employee was also accused of stealing drug evidence. Jaxon Van Derbeken, Crime
Lab Fallout: Drug Defendants Go Free, S.F. CHRON., May 11, 2010, available at
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f-/c/a/2010/03/11I/MNG8 1CDOTU.DTL.
41 MICHAELIS ET AL., supra note 7, at 92.
42 Murphy, supra note 37, at 754-55.
43 Bruce Budowle et al., Partial Matches in Heterogeneous Offender Databases Do Not
Call into Question the Validity of Random Match Probability Calculations, 123 I NT. J.
LEGAL MED. 59, 63 (2009).
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era, a DNA profile is less revealing than a Social Security number.44 If
scientists discover that forensic DNA profiles code for traits, the most
we will learn is that offenders do or do not have that trait. In a society
that worries about supermarket smart cards and Google's use of
search terms,45 concern about the possible misuse of an immutable
string of numbers is understandable. But unlike Google and the
supermarket, which put personal data to economic use, government
agencies use DNA profiles to identify suspects in criminal cases.
This article calls for researcher access to offenders' profiles rather
than samples.46 The low-hanging fruit in the forensic DNA debate is
whether rarity statistics presented in court are accurate. Statisticians,
population geneticists, and other academics say they can answer this
question using existing stores of offenders' DNA profiles.47 Respect
for defendants' due process and other constitutional rights require
that they be allowed to try.48
Though questions about the rarity of DNA profiles arise most often
in the context of a criminal trial, the adversarial criminal justice
system is not the ideal forum for answering them.49 If U.S.
government agencies continue to resist any outside testing of their
44 "Identity thieves can use your [Social Security] number and your good credit to apply for
more credit in your name." Social Security Admin., Identity Theft and Your Social Security
Number, http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/1oo64.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2010). DNA profiles
are currently useless to identity thieves.
45 See, e.g., Consumers Against Supermarket Privacy Invasion and Numbering, Food
Industry News, http://www.nocards.org/news/archive2.shtml (last visited Apr. 15, 2010);
Alex Pham & Michelle Quinn, Critics to Google: Privacy Please, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 15,
2007, at Ci.
46 Research on offenders' DNA samples might someday prove necessary. However, fears
that the study of offender DNA profiles will lead to this research is not a reason to avoid the
more limited step.
47 See, e.g., D. E. Krane et al., supra note 15; Letter from Dan E. Krane et al., supra note 14(asking, as sixteen academics concerned about the accuracy of DNA rarity statistics, for
access to the national DNA database).
48 The nature of potential constitutional violations stemming from DNA database secrecy is
beyond the scope of this article. However, in a recent subpoena of the California offender
database, a defense lawyer invoked her client's rights to confrontation, cross-examination,
and due process. Opposition to Attorney General's Motion to Quash Subpoena Duces
Tecum, People v. Ford, No. SCN 2151192 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 15, 2oo8); See also Murphy,
supra note 37, at 791 (noting that defendants' counsel and due process rights "clearly
contemplate" at least some access to offender databases).
49 See infra, notes 359-366 and accompanying text.
databases,5o however, the courtroom remains the best venue in which
to address the constitutionality of total secrecy. Defense lawyers will
continue to seek access to databases, or ask to run special searches.
These requests are seldom successful,5' but they show no sign of
flagging even as the media begins to call for outside testing of offender
databases.52 Government agencies have the power to put a stop to
this type of litigation, or at least buttress its arguments against it.
Existing laws allow them to release an anonymous, encrypted version
of the database to independent statistical researchers.53
If the government chooses secrecy, forensic DNA technology could
lose its place as the gold standard of forensic methods. In early 2009,
the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) slammed as unscientific
every forensic technique other than DNA evidence.54 With the
exception of DNA analysis, the NAS found, "no forensic method has
been rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with a
high degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection between evidence
and a specific individual or source."ss Even so, the NAS noted that
"DNA evidence is [not] always unassailable in the courtroom."56 For
example, searching large DNA databases for suspects "might yield
false positives with some regularity."s7 Pretending these problems do
50 For example, the FBI recently denied a request from sixteen statisticians, geneticists, and
other academics to study the national offender database. Letter from D. Christian Hassell,
Dir. FBI Laboratory, to Dan E. Krane, Professor of Biological Sciences, Wright State Univ.
(Dec. 22, 2009) (on file with author). However, it recognized the need for "revalidating
previous assumptions and continuing to improve the foundations upon which the database
is based..." Id. at 2. To that end, the FBI is "exploring ways to address some of the topics"
the scientists raised. Id.
5 See supra note 32.
52 See, e.g., Editorial, DNA Evidence: WhatAre the Real Chances ofMistakes?, LAS VEGAS
REV. J., July 29, 2008, at Bio; Editorial, Should We Trust DNA?, S.F. CHRON., July 28,
2008, at B4.
53 See infra Part III.
54 NAT'L RES. COUNCIL COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIS.
CMTY., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 7
(2009), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record-id=12589 [hereinafter NAS
Report].
ss Id.
56 Id. at loo.
57 Id. at 100 n.6i (summarizing the work of B.S. Weir, The Rarity of DNA Profiles, i
ANNALS APPLIED STAT. 358 (2007)).
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not exist will not make them go away. By hiding DNA from rigorous
scientific scrutiny, the government risks discrediting the one forensic
technique rooted in science.58  Donald Kennedy, a biologist at
Stanford University and co-chair of the committee that produced the
NAS Report, advocates for scientific study of offender databases.59
"Science depends on the free flow of information and data," he wrote
in a letter supporting a defense attorney's attempt to subpoena
California's offender database.60 "To prevent access to, and analysis
of, these data would be inappropriate and antithetical to scientific
progress."61 Science requires inquiry even when the outcomes are
uncertain or likely to confirm conventional wisdom.62
People are going to prison based on a technology that requires
further study, and government agencies control the only data set large
enough to check the math involved. While this article discusses this
issue as it plays out in the federal and state governments, it primarily
focuses on California, home to the largest state offender database in
the nation.63 Part I describes the ways in which law enforcement uses
DNA databases, and the scientific debate regarding prevailing DNA
statistics. Part II evaluates arguments used by government agencies
to block outsider access to DNA databases. Part III examines DNA
database statutes and determines that they allow the disclosure of
DNA profiles for scientific research. Part IV examines three situations
in which government agencies disclose sensitive information about
individuals, and calls for the release of DNA profiles to qualified
researchers using controls already in place for genetic health research.
58 Id. at 8 (noting that "there is a notable dearth of peer-reviewed, published studies
establishing the scientific bases and validity of many forensic methods").
59 Letter from Donald Kennedy, supra note 15 (pointing out that "[t]here is considerable
scientific interest in this problem-not only because it might help clarify an unexpected
result, but because the knowledge to be gained may assist in the appropriate use of such




63 CODIS Statistics, supra note 10.
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I. THE PROBLEM OF DNA DATABASE SECRECY
California's DNA database dates to 1983, when the legislature
passed a law requiring convicted sex offenders to provide blood and
saliva specimens upon release from prison.64 Other states also began
creating DNA databases around this time,6 s and in 1994 Congress
passed the DNA Identification Act, which established the FBI's
Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) linking local, state, and federal
DNA databases. 66 The DNA profiles in these databases fall into two
general categories: (1) "forensic" profiles derived from DNA found at
crime scenes, and (2) "offender" or "known" profiles, which
correspond to persons who voluntarily donated DNA samples or were
forced to do so by statute.67
CODIS, which went live in October 1998,68 linked state and federal
databases that would grow to include more than 7.9 million offender
DNA profiles in eleven years. 69 California is by far the biggest
6 CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.2, repealed by DNA and Forensic Identification Database and
Data Bank Act of 1998, CAL. PENAL CODE § 295 (West 2010).
6s In 1985, England was the first country to use forensic DNA for law-enforcement
purposes. H.R. Rep. No. 103-45 (1993). Florida was the first state to follow suit, in 1987. Id.
66 DNA Identification Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, io8 Stat. 2o65; Peter Finn,
Revolution Underway in Use of DNA Profiles, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 1997, at B4. The
crime-fighting potential of DNA was incredibly promising, but some were wary of a
centralized genetic repository. See, e.g., Robert S. Boyd, DNA on File for Millions in
America-States Saving Data on Babies, Criminals; Privacy Fears Raised, SEATILE
TIMES, Nov. 1, 1994, at A12. James Watson, who shared the Nobel Prize for helping
discover DNA, lobbied against genetic data collection, testifying at a 1991 congressional
hearing that "[t]he idea that there will be a huge databank of genetic information on
millions of people is repulsive." Id.
67See Murphy, supra note 37, at 738. Professor Murphy notes that scholars and courts
continue to grapple with the scope and constitutionality of the many offender-collection
statutes on the books. Murphy, supra note 37, at 738 n.73. Courts have generally upheld
mandatory DNA sampling of convicted offenders. See, e.g., United States v. Kriesel, 5o8
F.3d 941,950 (9th Cir. 2007) (upholding compulsory DNA sampling of non-violent
felons); United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 816, 840 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc)
(upholding compulsory DNA sampling of violent felons).
68 Richard Willing, With DNA Databases on Fast Track, Legal Questions Loom, USA
TODAY, Mar. 1, 1999, at 5A.
69 FBI, CODIS-NDIS Statistics: Measuring Success,
http://www.fbi.gov/hi/lab/codis/clickmap.htm (last visited Apr. 21, a1) [hereinafter
CODIS Measuring Success]. State and federal agencies added more than 2.8 million
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contributor to this data pool, maintaining more than 1.25 million
offender profiles as of February 2010-twice as many as Florida, the
state with the second-largest offender database.70 State lawmakers
decide whom to include within each state's offender database.7' DNA
collection laws initially targeted people convicted of a felony, or
certain kinds of felonies, but some states have expanded offender
databases to include arrestees and people convicted of
misdemeanors.72 In early 2009, California began storing the DNA
profiles of all adults arrested for a felony.73
Law enforcement agencies search these databases to find
investigative leads in criminal cases. As of February 2010, CODIS had
produced more than 107,6oo hits linking crime scenes through a
common perpetrator, or linking a known offender to an unsolved
crime.74 Some of these cases, known as "cold hits," had languished for
years and would likely have remained unsolved if not for a match or
partial match in CODIS.75 The FBI and state law-enforcement
agencies are becoming increasingly reliant on cold hits to solve
offender profiles between October 2007 and February 2010. See CODIS Measuring
Success, supra; FBI, National DNA Index System,
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/national.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2olo).
70 CODIS Statistics, supra note 1o.
71 DNA.gov, State DNA Database Statutes, http://www.dna.gov/statutes-caselaw/state-
statutes/database/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2010). Federal law governs DNA collection from
people arrested, charged, or convicted for federal crimes. See 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)(A)
(West 2010).
72 Compare DNA.GOV, 20oo FORENSIC DNA EXPANSION LEGISLATION, available at
http://www.dnaresource.com/documents/200oDNADatabaseExpansionbills.pdf (last
visited Apr. 21, 2010), with DNA.GOV, 2009 DNA DATABASE LEGISLATION, available at
http://www.trendtrack.com/texis/app/viewrpt?event=495bdbf6ba (last visited Apr. 29,
2010), and DNA.GOV, 2008 DNA DATABASE EXPANSION LEGISLATION (Oct. 22, 2008),
available at
http://www.dnaresource.com/documents/2oo8DNAExpansionLegislation.pdf. For a
year-by-year snapshot of state DNA database expansion legislation, visit
http://www.dnaresource.com/expansion.html.
73 Information Bulletin, Cal. Dep't of Justice (Dec. 15, 2oo8), available at
http://ag.ca.gov/bfs/pdf/69IB_1215o8.pdf. Voters authorized the inclusion of arrestees
\in 2004. Id.
74 CODIS Measuring Success, supra note 69.
7s Some jurisdictions allow prosecutors to circumvent statutes of limitations by filing
charges against suspects identified only by their DNA profiles. MICHAELIS ET AL., supra
note 7, at 24-25.
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crimes.76 The FBI, which reported 19,500 cold hits by November
2004, had made more than 47,000 cold hits by March 2007.77 It took
the state of Virginia eight years to make looo cold hits, and eighteen
months to make another thousand. 8
A cold hit in the database-the same kind of lead that pointed
police to John Puckett-is sometimes the only evidence linking a
person to a crime.79 Some of the offenses in cold-hit cases are decades
old, increasing the likelihood that witnesses have died or do not
remember events with the clarity they once did.ao The Puckett case is
an example of this; by the time Puckett's case went to trial, Diana
Sylvester's landlady and an early suspect were dead, and police had
lost a bloody parking ticket they found in the suspect's car and
matched to Sylvester's blood type.81 Furthermore, most courts have
upheld convictions resting almost entirely on DNA evidence.82 This is
true even when corroborating evidence is weak or conflicts with other
evidence.83 In these cases, jurors might be swayed by a form of the
76 Yun S. Song et al., Average Probability that a "Cold Hit" in a DNA Database Search
Results in an Erroneous Attribution, 54 J. FORENSIC SCI. 22, 22 (2009).
77 Id.
78 Id. Of the first looo cold hits in Virginia, loo resulted in guilty pleas or guilty verdicts,
seven resulted in not-guilty verdicts, and fifty-three were not prosecuted. Id. The
remaining 752 were pending at the time of the survey. Id.
79 See Murphy, supra note 37, at 738 (noting that DNA and other forensic technologies
"allow for the identification of perpetrators even in the absence of any other evidence").
Professor Murphy notes that the lack of central record keeping, among other reasons, make
it "difficult to determine the frequency with which the government presently brings cases
in which the only evidence is genetic material." Murphy, supra note 37, at 742. Few
laboratories monitor a case after the match is made, and they do not track whether
investigators turned up evidence beyond the match in the database. Id. Also, DNA is
daunting evidence likely to result in a guilty plea. Id.
So See Song et al., supra note 76, at 22. Federal funding programs encourage states to
reopen unsolved cases and conduct DNA testing. Id at 22, 241n.7 (citing Justice for All Act
of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2260).
8i Smith, supra note 4.
82 Song et al., supra note 76, at 22, 24 nn.8-lo (citing Roberson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 156,
170 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); People v. Johnson, 139 Cal. App. 4th 1135 (Cal. Ct. App.
2OO6)).
83 Song et al., supra note 766, at 23, 24 nn.ii, 15 & 18 (citing United States v. Jenkins, 887
A.2d 1013 (D.C. 2005) (allowing a murder and burglary prosecution to proceed based
largely on genetic evidence despite the fact that another man was found in possession of
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CSI Effect, a phenomenon in which jurors inculcated by the television
portrayal of foolproof forensic evidence come to expect it in all
criminal cases, and when they get it, to trust it implicitly.84 DNA
evidence is especially persuasive to juries. 85 On average, jurors
believe DNA evidence is 95 percent accurate and 94 percent
persuasive of guilt, according to studies. 86
John Puckett is not the only accused whose DNA match is
described by disparate statistics. During the proceedings of the
National Commission on the Future of DNA Evidence in 2000, the
chair, geneticist James Crow, mentioned news of a DNA match
between crime scene evidence and a person who turned out to be
innocent.8 7 "The New York Times regarded that as surprising," Crow
said. "I regard it as not at all surprising."88 In an American court, the
prosecution would likely have told the jury that the probability of a
coincidental match between the innocent man and the true
perpetrator was one in thirty-seven million.89 However, when
calculated to account for the fact that investigators made the match
the victim's credit cards the day after the incident); Riggs v. State, 809 N.E.2d 322 (Ind.
2004) (non-DNA evidence: defendant lived near victim); State v. Hunter, 861 N.E.2d 898,
901 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006) (upholding a rape conviction based on a semen sample although
"literally no other evidence" linked the defendant to the crime); Convicted Murderer Seeks
Retrial, KALAMAZOO GAZETTE, May 10, 20o6, at Local News (defendant convicted of 36-
year-old murder despite the fact that DNA tests turned up his profile along with that of a
person who was 4 years old at the time of the murder)).
84 Prosecutors believe that the CSI Effect leads juries to acquit in the absence of scientific
evidence, while defense attorneys say it explains jurors' willingness to convict based upon
forensic evidence alone. Michael Mann, CSI Effect: Better Jurors Through Television and
Science, 24 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 211, 213 (2005-2006). Yet Professors Simon Cole and
Rachel Dioso-Villa examined acquittal rates before and after the show first aired, and did
not find enough of a change to "warrant panic about the existence of a CSI Effect." Simon
A. Cole & Rachel Dioso-Villa, Investigating the 'CSI Effect'Effect: Media and Litigation
Crisis in Criminal Law, 61 STAN. L. REv. 1335, 1364(2009).
85 Lieberman et al., supra note 1.
861d. at 52-53.
87 Proceedings, Nat'l Comm'n on the Future of DNA Evidence, Research and Dev. Working





through a database search, the chance of a match grew to two
percent.90
Even without the complicating factor of a database search, DNA
statistics rest upon assumptions. Population geneticists developed
these statistics a decade ago using databases containing about looo
people divided into discrete racial groups.9 1 These statistics assume
that such a small database is adequate to estimate the rarity of DNA
profiles in the general population.92 DNA rarity statistics also assume
that the DNA markers within DNA profiles are independent of each
other, rather than inherited together.93 But if some strings of
numbers within DNA profiles are dependent, meaning they are
inherited together, certain DNA profiles might be less rare than DNA
statistics say they are. Finally, DNA rarity statistics mathematically
correct for the fact that people are related to one another and thus are
more likely to share DNA patterns. 94 Large-scale empirical research
would determine whether this correction is adequate.95
Analysis of the database could also prove useful for other reasons.
Access to the national DNA database would let scientists test the
frequency with which three-person DNA mixtures are consistent with
multiple people's DNA.9 6 Further, studies of the database could shed
light on the number of database errors that result from typos. 97 A
quality-control study in Victoria, Australia, found that this kind of
error occurred once every 300 entries.98 These errors likely make
90 Id. This figure-2 percent-is calculated by multiplying the random match probability (1
in 37 million) by 700,000, the number of profiles in the database. Id. For a description of
this calculation, known as the NRC II formula, see supra note 8.
91 Mueller Decl. IL, supra note 15, at 5; Mueller Decl. I, supra note 15, at 1; Letter from
Krane et al., supra note 14, at 1.
92 Mueller Decl. I, supra note 15, at 1.
93 Id.
94 Id.; Letter from Dan E. Krane et al., supra note 14, at 2.
95 Mueller Decl. I, supra note 15, at i; Letter from Dan E. Krane et al., supra note 14, at 2
(noting that the national DNA database provides an opportunity for "real world tests of
propositions that previously have been addressable only by simulation," including the
significance of relatives in the database).
96 Letter from Dan E. Krane et al., supra note 14, at 2.
97 Id. at3.
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individuals within the database invisible to technicians searching for
matches.99
While they are not the large-scale analyses of offender databases
that scientists say are warranted, technicians have searched states'
offender databases for matches within them. In 2001, Arizona crime
laboratory analyst Kathryn Troyer ignited interest in the study of
offender databases when she found a nine-marker match between two
men who did not appear related.oo One was black and the other was
white, and they had different names and birthdates.o1 The Arizona
database contained 1o,ooo profiles at the time, and DNA statistics put
the chances of a coincidental match like the one Troyer found at one
in 754 million for whites and one in 561 million for blacks.o2 Four
years later, a judge ordered the Arizona laboratory to conduct another
search for DNA matches within the database.1o3 By then its contents
had swelled to 65,493 profiles, of which 122 pairs matched at nine
markers and twenty pairs matched at ten markers.104 No one has
shown that the people associated with these profiles are related.1o5
The significance of Troyer's results is a matter of debate. Some
scientists say statistical principles explain the high number of matches
within a small database, especially given the number of close relatives
that tend to populate DNA databases.1o6 And the nature of Troyer's
search was different from the normal procedure, which is to compare
99 Id.





105 Jason Felch & Maura Dolan, DNA: Genes as Evidence: FBI Resists Scrutiny of
'Matches', L.A. TIMES, July 20, 2008, at A. The search turned up two more matches-one
at eleven markers and one at twelve-that later turned out to be relatives. Id.
uo Steven P. Myers, Felon-To-Felon STR Partial Profile Matches in the Arizona Database:
Don't Panic!, available at
http://www.nasams.org/forensics/for_1ib/Documents/1148592247.61/Myers%20CAC%2
oPresentation.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2010); MICHAELIS ET AL., supra note 7, at 130
(noting that the statistical phenomenon at play is known as the Birthday Problem). For an
explanation of the Birthday Problem, see Scoff Simon, Math Guy: The Birthday Problem,
NPR, Mar. 19, 2005, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld= 4542341.
[Vol. 6:2274
a specific DNA profile to each profile within the database.1o7 In
Arizona in 2005, that would have involved making 65,493
comparisons-one for every profile in the database. Looking for
matches among profiles within the database involved some two billion
comparisons, making it much more likely that this kind of search
would turn up matches.1o 8
Other statisticians believe that the Arizona matches make sense
only if the database contained between looo and 3000 pairs of
siblings.1o9 In a declaration, Laurence D. Mueller, a professor of
ecology and evolutionary biology at University of California, Irvine,
wrote that the Arizona results "suggest that the [current] model may
contain flaws."1lo
Spurred by events in Arizona, defense attorneys began requesting
similar searches of other states' criminal-offender databases."' The
FBI and state law enforcement agencies have balked, saying these
searches would: (1) lead the FBI to expel states from the CODIS
network; (2) violate convicted offenders' privacy; (3) monopolize
databases needed to catch criminals; and (4) be fruitless given the
database's unsuitability for study.112 These concerns are explored in
depth in the following part of this article.
California courts, and those of other states, have blocked "Arizona
searches."113 Courts in Illinois and Maryland have allowed them.
Illinois' 220,OOO-person database yielded 903 pairs of profiles that
matched at nine or more markers."4 Maryland's fewer-than-30,ooo-
person database turned up thirty-two pairs of profiles that matched at
nine or more markers."s Of these, three pairs were perfect thirteen-
107 Felch & Dolan, supra note 105.
108 Id.
109 Mueller, supra note 30, at io6.
110 Mueller Decl. I, supra note 15, at 1.
1n Felch & Dolan, supra note io5; See also Felch & Dolan, supra note 4.
112 Felch & Dolan, supra note 105.
113 Id.
114Id. People v. Wright, Nos. 1-07-3106, 1-07-3464, 2010 WL 1194903, at *12 (Ill. App. Ct.
Mar. 26, 2010). Illinois's matches helped persuade an appeals court in People v. Wright to
order a new trial for a defendant denied his own Arizona search. People v. wright, Nos. i-
07-3106, 1-07-3464, 2010 WL 1194903, at *12 (Ill. App. Ct. Mar. 26, aoio).
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marker matches." 6 Population geneticists say these three pairs are
probably duplicates, or they belong to identical twins or brothers."7
But if they are matches between unrelated people, they "defy[] odds as
remote as 1 in 1 quadrillion.""8 No one knows which is true because
"Maryland officials never did the research to find out.""19
Even if state officials had inquired further, Arizona searches are
not the large-scale, rigorous studies statisticians and population
geneticists say are necessary to test the assumptions underlying DNA
statistics. Bruce Weir, a statistician at the University of Washington
whose population genetics studies are the basis for forensic DNA
probabilities, told the Los Angeles Times that offender databases
could be used to test his estimates.120 "Instead of saying we predict
there will be a match, let's open it up and look," he said.121
Many of his colleagues agree. Science handed DNA technology to
law enforcement, and scientists want to make sure their discoveries
are still valid, especially given their use identifying suspects.
"[S]tudies of model data sets have their place," wrote sixteen
professors in a letter to the FBI asking it to release the offender
database, without names, for study.122 But "definitive results can be
obtained only with real data."123 In a letter, the FBI recognized the
need for "revalidating previous assumptions" and said it was
"exploring ways to address" some of the points the scientists made.124
Nonetheless, the agency denied their request days after a larger group
of thirty-nine academics and lawyers published a letter to the editor of
Science calling for scrutiny of DNA databases.125 As they note, the FBI









124 Letter from D. Christian Hassell, supra note 50, at 2.
12s Id. at 1-2; Krane et al., supra note 15.
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has published no research derived from the DNA information it holds,
nor has it allowed others to do s0.126
State law enforcement agencies also resist this research. In a
motion to quash a defense attorney's subpoena of the California
database-a subpoena supported by non-government scientists from
major research universities-lawyers for California's Department of
Justice (DOJ) characterized the defense's interest in the contents of
the offender database as a desire to "conduct mysterious research or
engage in data manipulation."27 Yet peer-reviewed scientific inquiry
is the antidote to mystery and manipulation. It is a collaborative
process in which scientists make discoveries, publish those discoveries
in peer-reviewed journals, test them some more, and let the larger
scientific community reach consensus as to the quality of the original
discovery.128 Only more research will reveal whether the science
underlying forensic DNA databases "has been performed in
accordance with established standards in the field," wrote
Montgomery Slatkin, a population geneticist at University of
California, Berkeley, in a declaration in support of the database
subpoena. "No such confidence exists at the present time," he said.129
Other scientists agree with Slatkin.130 Research on the offender
database "is long overdue," said Keith Devlin, a mathematics
professor at Stanford University.'3' Given that the contents of a DNA
database could be encoded to ensure anonymity, "it is ... scientifically
imperative that it be analyzed, [regardless] of any other
considerations,"132 he said. "To do otherwise would run counter to the
126 Krane et al., supra note 47.
127 Ford Motion to Quash, supra note 32, at 15.
128 Decl. of Montgomery Slatkin, supra note 15 (arguing that "these databases should be
made available to qualified researchers who are outside the forensic genetics community
and the result of their analyses should be published in the scientific literature in
accordance with the standard practice"); Mueller Decl. 1, supra note 15, at 3 (noting that
"this is how science works: through an open exchange of ideas and research, and the
development of real world tests for existing hypotheses and theories").
129 Decl. of Montgomery Slatkin, supra note 128.
130 See, e.g., Letter from Dan E. Krane et al., supra note 14.
131 Letter from Keith Devlin, supra note 15.
132 Id.
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very principles of sound science and of sound legal practice based on
proven science."'33
The idea that longstanding scientific principles require continued
study can be a troublesome concept to judges, who seek finality in the
law. Once a legal issue has been decided, its power as precedent can
outlive its wisdom in light of new information.34 At a 2006 hearing to
decide whether to grant a defense attorney's subpoena of the
California database, the trial judge asked Professor Slatkin if the
statistical analysis he advocated was likely to reveal flaws in the way
DNA statistics are currently calculated.135 "I had to say I didn't know,"
Slatkin said.136 "I said answering the question was the point of the
research."37 The judge denied the database search.138
In a rare departure,139 a three-judge panel in Illinois took the view
that denying a defendant access to an offender DNA database is an
error serious enough to warrant a new trial.140 The defendant, Harvey
Wright, was identified through a cold hit and prosecuted for the 1998
rape of a 15-year-old girl.141 The victim did not recognize Wright, and
the only physical evidence tying him to the crime was that his DNA
profile shared nine markers with DNA from the victim's rape kit.142
133 Id. (emphasizing that "[aldditional information, in particular empirical statistical
information about the very data used in criminal investigations, can surely not do
otherwise than make our judicial system even more reliable than it is already. I am
unaware of any creditable reason to do otherwise").
'34 For example, courts continue to admit fingerprints and other forensic evidence despite
the fact that these methods have no demonstrated scientific basis. See NAS REPORT, supra
note 54. A trial court that questioned the probative value of fingerprint evidence was
ridiculed to the point of reversing itself. Murphy, supra note 37, at 768 n.205.
35 Jon Jefferson, Cold Hits Meet Cold Facts: Are DNA Matches Infallible?, TRANSCRIPT,




139 See supra note 32.
140 People v. Wright, Nos. 1-07-3106, 1-07-3464, 2010 WL 1194903 (Ill. App. Ct. Mar. 26,
2010).
141 Id. at *1, *4-*6.
142 Id. at *1, *6.
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The jury heard infinitesimal rarity statistics-one in 420 trillion for
African Americans, one in 670 trillion for whites, or one in 2.9
quadrillion for Hispanics.143 In the hopes of undermining these
numbers, the defendant asked the trial court for permission to search
the Illinois's offender database for nine-marker matches within it.144
The trial court refused, and in 2007 Wright was convicted and
sentenced to life in prison.145 The appellate panel held that denying
his motion was an "error so serious that it affected the fairness of the
defendant's trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial
process."4 6 It noted Arizona search results in Illinois and elsewhere,
and said that the trial court's decision barred the "defendant's access
to evidence that could have assisted him in establishing his innocence"
by "casting a serious doubt" upon the DNA evidence presented by the
prosecution.147
If most courts have been reluctant to address this problem, 148 So
has the executive branch. As noted above, the FBI rejected a request
by sixteen scientists seeking access to the contents of the national
offender database.149 It did so despite the Obama Administration's
warning that the "public must trust the science and scientific process
informing public policy decisions."lso Even though "science and
technological information . . . developed and used by the Federal
143 Id. at *6.
144 Id. at *2.
145 Id. at *1, *3, *7*
146 Id. at *11.
147 Id. at *11-*12. This ruling might have been influenced by the fact that Illinois is among
the few states with a statute allowing defendants to request searches of the state's offender
database. Murphy, supra note 37 at 790-91 (citing 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/116-5 (2005)
and GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-63 (2005)). However, defendants' "rights to due process and
the assistance of counsel clearly contemplate" this kind of search even without a statutory
framework. Id.
148 See supra note 32.
149 Letter from D. Christian Hassell, supra note 50.
150 Press Release, The White House, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments
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Government ... should ordinarily be made available to the public,"
the FBI did not heed.1s1
Authorities in Australia have taken a different approach. In 2003,
technicians there matched DNA from the clothing of a murdered child
to a rape victim with no connection to the case-a match that
prevailing science would say has a one in 269 million chance of being
coincidental.152 During the inquest that followed, the Victoria Police
Forensic Services Centre made its 15,ooo-profile offender database
available to an American geneticist, who studied it for partial
matches.153 The database was too small to determine whether forensic
DNA matches are as common as current statistics say they are.154
A court system that leans so heavily on science in the
administration of justice must also embrace the scientific tenet that
more knowledge is better than less knowledge. This idea likely drives
those who believe that current DNA statistics are accurate, yet see
value in double and triple checking. "I, for one, would be surprised if
major modifications were required," wrote David Kaye, a law
professor at Arizona State University with an advanced degree in
science.155 "But expectations are no substitute for inquiry."156
The next part of this article evaluates government agencies' arguments
against independent research of forensic DNA databases.
II. PRO-SECRECY ARGUMENTS Do NOT HOLD UP
As noted in Part I, the FBI and other law enforcement agencies
protect the secrecy of forensic DNA profiles. Granting outsiders
access to them would, they say: (1) lead the FBI to expel states from
the CODIS network; (2) violate convicted offenders' privacy; (3)
monopolize databases needed to catch criminals; and (4) prove
151 Id.
152 Gary Tippet & Selma Milovanovic, Who Killed Jaidyn? A Sad Saga Continues..., THE
AGE (MELBOURNE, AUSTL.), Nov. 18, 2003, available at
http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/11/17/1o69O27047383.html; WILLIAM C.
THOMPSON, VICTORIA STATE CORONER'S INQUEST INTO DEATH OF JAIDYN LESKIE 4 (Dec.
3, 2003), available at http://www.bioforensics.com/articles/Thompsonreport.pdf.
153 Mueller, supra note 30, at 102.
154 Id.




fruitless because offender databases are unsuitable for testing the
reliability of DNA statistics. This part will analyze these arguments in
turn.
A. EXPULSION FROM CODIS: AN EMPTY THREAT
Government lawyers continue to argue that nothing short of total
secrecy protects a state's membership in the national CODIS
system. 57 Their concern is that releasing a state's offender database
to an outside researcher would allow the FBI to expel the state from
the national DNA network, cutting off that state's law enforcement
agencies from offender databases around the country. Government
lawyers in California have repeatedly raised this argument in their
efforts to prevent defense experts from accessing the state's offender
database.5 8 They cite two sources of support for their position-the
federal CODIS statute and California's Memorandum of
Understanding with the FBI.'59 As this article will show in Part III, the
CODIS statute expressly authorizes study of offender databases, and
the FBI cannot expel a state for doing what the statute allows. The
Memorandum of Understanding between California and the FBI
merely requires California to "take reasonable precautions to prevent
unauthorized persons from accessing the CODIS software."16 Access
that is legal under the CODIS statute is likely authorized under the
Memorandum of Understanding.
The threat of expulsion from CODIS has proved to be an empty
one.61 An investigation by the Los Angeles Times found that the FBI's
director of CODIS "advised state officials to raise the risk of expulsion
with a judge but told the officials that expulsion was unlikely to
actually happen."162 As noted above, the CODIS statute allows court-
ordered database access. Furthermore, the FBI and other states need
California's more than one million DNA profiles at least as much as
157 Felch & Dolan, supra note 105.
i51 Ford Motion to Quash, supra note 32, at 9; Motion to Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum,
People v. Davis, No. SCN 190226, 8 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 3, 2oo6) [hereinafter Davis
Motion to Quash].
159 Ford Motion to Quash, supra note 32, at 9; Davis Motion to Quash, supra note 158, at 8.
6o Davis Motion to Quash, supra note 158, at 8.
i6i Felch & Dolan, supra note 15-
162Id.
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California needs the rest of the CODIS network;163 the FBI had
uploaded only 156,344 profiles to CODIS as of February 2010.164
To prevent a court from ordering an Arizona search of Illinois's
offender database, Thomas Callaghan, director of the FBI's CODIS
system, met with state lab officials in 20o6 about "how to fight this." 6 5
According to the lab officials' summary of the meeting, Callaghan told
them to tell the court that Illinois could be disconnected from CODIS
if it authorized an Arizona search.166 He then went on to assure lab
officials that "it would in fact be unlikely that [Illinois] would be
disconnected."' 67 Callaghan disputes this account of the meeting, but
acknowledged that "it takes a lot for a state to be cut off from the
national database."168
State and federal officials used the same strategy in Maryland.169
There, a state lawyer argued that conducting an Arizona search of the
Maryland database would be "catastrophic" because it could lead to
the state's expulsion from CODIS.17o The state's DNA administrator,
Michelle Groves, filed a supporting affidavit edited by FBI officials.'7'
Before submitting the affidavit to the court, Groves sent an e-mail to
FBI officials saying, "Let's see if this will work."172
It did not work. The trial court held firm.173 "This court will not
accept the notion that the extent of a person's due process rights
hinges solely on whether some employee of the FBI chooses to
163 Id.
164 CODIS Statistics, supra note 10.
165 Felch & Dolan, supra note 105 (referring to a crime lab's conversation log dated July 5,








173 Id.; State v. Davis, No. CT 05-OO24X (Md. Cir. Ct. Aug. 4, 2006) (Platt, J.).
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authorize the use of the [database] software," the court wrote.174
Searches went ahead in Illinois and Maryland.175 Both are still
members of CODIS.176
Despite this history, government lawyers continue to invoke the
threat of expulsion from CODIS. Arguing successfully against a
subpoena of California's offender DNA database, state lawyers warned
of "expulsion from the national CODIS network."177 In reality, the
FBI is either unwilling to expel a needed state from its DNA network,
or searches and studies of offender databases do not violate federal
law. This article will explore the latter point in Part III.
B. EXAMINATION OF DNA DATABASES
DOES NOT THREATEN PRIVACY
Government agencies opposed to research involving DNA
databases invoke the privacy of people whose DNA profiles would be
studied.78 In a motion to quash a subpoena of California's offender
database, the state DOJ argued that secrecy is "a significant factor in
maintaining the program's constitutionality."79 It cited state and
federal cases in which courts have relied upon the limited use of
criminal offender DNA databases in holding them constitutional
under the Fourth Amendment.1so It specifically noted United States v.
Kincade, where the Ninth Circuit relied upon statutory confidentiality
protections to counter the argument that "soon, if not already,
scientists will request access to what would serve as [a] preexisting
goldmine of DNA data for their research."81 The FBI has long sought
to quell the fear that private companies might someday make use of
174 Felch & Dolan, supra note 105; State v. Davis, No. CT o5-0024X (Md. Cir. Ct. Aug. 4,
2006) (Platt, J.).
175 Felch & Dolan, supra note 105.
176 CODIS Statistics, supra note 10.
177 Ford Motion to Quash, supra note 32, at 9.
178 Felch & Dolan, supra note 105.
179 Ford Motion to Quash, supra note 32, at 7.
18o Id. (citing Alfaro v. Terhune, 98 Cal. App. 4th at 492,507-8 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); People
v. King, 82 Cal. App. 4th 1375, 1377 n.6 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000)).
181 Id. (citing United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 837 n.33 (9th Cir. 2004)).
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offender DNA databases.182 "People hear government, DNA,
computers, FBI, and they get wary," said Stephen Niezgoda, CODIS
program director.183 "I understand that. But the system is built to
maintain privacy."184 Privacy is incompatible with outside research,
according to the FBI. Bruce Budowle, former director of the FBI's
DNA laboratory at Quantico, Virginia, warned that a breach of privacy
and confidentiality would take place if the offender database were
subject to statistical study. 85 "The names of individuals with
matching and partial matching profiles would have to be disclosed to
scientists and police when there is no criminal investigation
underway," he wrote.186 "The names would be obtained because of a
'research experiment."'1 87
CODIS does not contain offenders' names,188 and to the extent
names are needed to distinguish among individuals, they can be
encoded. Furthermore, this article does not propose that law
enforcement agencies release offenders' DNA profiles for general
genetic research. Rather it argues that they should use DNA
databases to answer questions relating directly to the government's
use of the database and DNA evidence. 89 Research into possible
genetic roots of criminality or the study of offender profiles or samples
for commercial gain would be inappropriate. But if law-enforcement
agencies want to continue using DNA evidence in court, they must
also be willing to investigate whether the statistics that accompany
that evidence are accurate.
182 Finn, supra note 66.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Bruce Budowle et al., supra note 43.
i86 Id.
187 Id. Budowle has used offender profiles in his own research. See infra note 231 and
surrounding text.
188See infra note 199.
189 Releasing DNA databases for quality control supports the core purpose of forensic DNA
collection-accurately identifying suspects-while other uses do not. See Lazer & Mayer-
Schonberger, infra note 373.
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Some geneticists question whether DNA profiles can ever truly be
anonymous.190 In August 2008, privacy concerns prompted the
National Institutes of Health to remove from its public website the
genetic information of some 6o,ooo patients who donated their DNA
for research purposes on the condition that they not be linked to it.191
However, making genetic information available for download online,
or incorporating it into patients' medical records, is a more radical
dissemination than entrusting offenders' DNA profiles to a small
number of scientists. The offender database contains the same kind of
information already widely accessible through population-genetics
databases that scientists used to develop current DNA statistics.
California DOJ argued in a recent case that independent access to the
offender database was unnecessary given the availability of these
smaller DNA databases.92 It listed several of them, the largest of
which contains 17,000 thirteen-marker profiles.193 Since advocates
can be trusted to handle these DNA profiles, surely statisticians and
population geneticists can be trusted with criminal offender
databases. In fact, some scientists have used offenders' DNA for
scientific study, and in one of them, researchers published Illinois
offenders' profiles, without names, in the Journal of Forensic
Science.194 Moreover, the fact that state law allows independent
researchers to study newborns' DNA samples-a phenomenon
explored in Part III-argues against privacy claims about offenders'
DNA profiles.
190 See B. Malin & L. Sweeney, How (Not) to Protect Genomic Data Privacy in a
Distributed Network: Using Trail Re-identification to Evaluate and Design Anonymity
Protection Systems, 37 J. BIOMEDICAL INFORMATICS 179 (2003). Malin and Sweeney
examine the susceptibility of encrypted genetic information released in the healthcare
context to be re-identified to named persons using publicly available records and patient-
location visit patterns. Id. at 179. These kinds of re-identifications have taken place in
other contexts, including Google searches and Netflix queues. Posting of Tim Lee to
Techdirt, http://techdirt.com/articles/2oo71130/114oo5.shtml (Nov. 30, 2007, 14:41
PST).
191 Jason Felch, DNA Databases Blocked from the Public, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2008, at
A31.
192 Ford Motion to Quash, supra note 32, at 15.
193 Id.
194 Mueller, supra note 30, at 101 (referring to W.E. Frank et al., Y Chromosome STR
Haplotypes and Allele Frequencies in Illinois Caucasian, Affican American, and Hispanic
Males, 1I J. FORENSIC SI. 1207(2006)); Bruce Budowle et al., Population Studies on
Three Native Alaska Population Groups Using STR Loci, 129 FORENSIC SCI. INT'L 51
( 20oo1) .
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Scientists interested in DNA database research acknowledge that
offender profiles should not be publicly available.195 However, these
profiles can be used for research and remain confidential. Professor
Keith Devlin says "it would be a fairly straightforward task to create an
anonymized copy of an existing offender DNA database."9 6 Scientists
are accustomed to working with sensitive data, and confidentiality is
as assured here as it is in all genetic studies involving human
subjects.197
Furthermore, if the constitutionality of DNA databases rests in
part upon their confidentiality, it also rests upon the idea that they
contain useless genetic information.9 8  That is, that convicted
offender databases contain DNA sequences believed to reveal very
little, if anything, about convicted offenders. Law enforcement
officials have emphasized this since CODIS began.199
195 Decl. of Montgomery Slatkin, supra note 128. Professor David Kaye believes "that the
database should be available for statistical research by the entire scientific community.
Letter from David Kaye, supra note 155. He notes that the information "can and should be
released in an anonymized form so as not to compromise the privacy of the sources of the
data." Id.
196 Letter from Keith Devlin, supra note 15.
197 Decl. of Montgomery Slatkin, supra note 128. Furthermore, scientists entrusted with
the database in the context of a criminal case would surely "honor all court orders,
including protective orders, and would not use the data for any unlawful or inappropriate
purpose." Mueller Declaration II, supra note 15, at 3. "To suggest otherwise is misinformed
and misguided." Id. Mueller is one of sixteen scientists who asked the FBI for access to the
national offender DNA database, minus identifying information. Letter from Dan E. Krane
et al., supra note 14, at 1. In their request, they offered to sign "a reasonable confidentiality
agreement." Id. at 3.
198 See, e.g., United States v. Weikert, 504 F-3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2007) ("the possibility that
junk DNA may not be junk DNA some day [sic] ... does not significantly augment Weikert's
privacy interest in the present case"); United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 83 7 (9th Cir.
2004) (emphasizing that a DNA profile "establishes only a record of the defendant's
identity").
199 The unrevealing nature of forensic DNA has been central to legal arguments in defense
of its collection. In United States v. Kincade, a case that challenged the constitutionality of
forcing offenders to surrender DNA samples, the federal government argued that the
"genetic markers contained in the DNA sample serve as a 'genetic fingerprint' in that they
uniquely identify an individual, but do not convey any other information about the person,
such as physical or medical characteristics." Appellee's Brief, United States v. Kincade,
2002 WL 32181457, at *8-*9 (9th Cir. Oct. 30, 2002). It noted that DNA records in
CODIS do not contain names. Id. at 9. They contain: "(1) an agency identifier for the
agency submitting the DNA profile; (2) the specimen identification number; Q3) the DNA
profile; and (4) the name of the personnel associated with the DNA analysis." Id.
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In 1999, an FBI spokesperson told USA Today that the type of
DNA used for forensic identification reveals no genetic information.200
"Our lab people call it 'junk DNA," he said.20 Barry Duceman,
director of biological sciences at the New York State Police Forensic
Investigation Center, made similar assurances. 2 0 2  "It's junk DNA,
something that doesn't even carry characteristics that could identify a
person, even height or eye color," he told a newspaper in 2000.203
California officials have also minimized the privacy concerns involved
in collecting offenders' DNA profiles. "California samples include only
the most basic genetic materials, sometimes referred to as 'junk
DNA,' said Hallye Jorden, a spokesperson for former state Attorney
General Bill Lockyer, in 2004.204 "All these samples have are
identifying markers about who these people are," she said.205
Even so, insurance companies or employers might use offender
DNA databases to screen patients or job applicants. Laws exist to
prevent this kind of discrimination,206 but to guard against it states
could require that law enforcement encrypt the offender database
before releasing it to outsiders. Scientists want to know the rarity of
certain combinations of genetic code. While the common convention
is to represent genetic code as strings of universally accepted
200 Willing, supra note 68.
201 Id.
202 Linda Trischitta, As DNA Use Rises, so Do Concerns, TIMES UNION (ALBANY, N.Y.),
Mar. 5, 2000, at Al.
203 Id. This same point came up in a television interview with Angelo Della Manna, head of
DNA analysis for the state of Alabama. 6o Minutes: A Not So Perfect Match (CBS
television broadcast July 15, 2007) (transcript on file with author). The correspondent
asked Manna, "When you look at [a DNA profile], can you tell me what color eyes that
person has, or how tall they are? Or anything like that?" Manna responded: "No, not at all.
The areas that we look at are commonly referred to as ... junk DNA." Id.
204Matt Krupnick, Future to Grow More Clear on DNA Sampling; Ballot Measure, Trials
and Supreme Court Decision Will Affect Application of Technology, CONTRA COSTA
TIMES, Sept. 5, 2004, at A33.
205 Id.
206 See, e.g., Genetic Nondiscrimination Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-233 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). Professor Laurence Mueller notes that much
of what DNA databases might reveal is publicly available. Mueller Decl. II, supra note 15,
at 3. It would be "far easier and cheaper to simply check public records to see if someone
had been convicted of [a] crime that qualified them for inclusion in these databases." Id.
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numbers, government agencies could easily encrypt them using a new
set of letters, numbers, or even symbols. And to ward off concern
about duplicate profiles in the database or the release of offenders'
names, states could encrypt individuals' identifying information as
well.
C. STATISTICAL DATABASE RESEARCH DOES NOT PREVENT POLICE
FROM CATCHING CRIMINALS
Some opponents of offender database research contend that it
would have "dire consequences," including corrupting the database or
taking it away from its primary function of catching criminals.207 This
argument is discredited, and Michael Chamberlain, the attorney who
leads California DOJ's resistance to database disclosure, said his office
had abandoned it.208
Nonetheless, practical concerns have been a central tenet in favor
of secrecy. During litigation to avoid an Arizona search of the
Maryland database, the state DNA administrator argued in court that
such a search might corrupt the database system.2 0 9 The trial court
ordered the search anyway.210 The system did not crash.2n
In United States v. Berger, a criminal DNA case in Washington,
D.C., federal prosecutors said that performing an Arizona search on
the national database could take as long as six months.212 "This seems
to be a tremendously inflated estimate," wrote Professor Laurence
Mueller in a declaration to the court.213 It could be done in fewer than
eight days, he estimated.214 Furthermore, given that the entire CODIS
database-which at that time contained more than 3.5 million
profiles-could fit easily on a compact disk, the FBI need not interrupt
207 Felch & Dolan, supra note 105.
20s Telephone Interview with Michael Chamberlain, Deputy Attorney Gen., Cal. Dep't of
Justice (Feb. 26, 2009).
209 Felch & Dolan, supra note 105.
210 Id.; State v. Davis, No. CT 05-oo24X (Md. Cir. Ct. Aug. 4, 2006) (Platt, J.).
211 Felch & Dolan, supra note 1o5.





its investigatory work to do the analysis, he wrote?' 5 The judge denied
the search.216
Professor Montgomery Slatkin also rejects the idea that statistical
research of offender profiles might thwart the database's effectiveness
as a law enforcement tool. The state could analyze the database using
a backup data set, leaving CODIS to the task of fighting crime, he
said.217 "I back up my computer every night," Slatkin said. "I would
hope the government does the same."21s
Laws in Illinois and other states allow criminal defendants and
people convicted of crimes to ask law enforcement to conduct DNA
database searches that might produce exculpatory evidence or
exonerate them.219 These searches presumably take the database away
from its task of finding new cold hits, with no disastrous results. Even
so, post-conviction DNA testing encountered the same kinds of
warnings now raised in opposition to the study of DNA databases. In
an editorial arguing in favor of DNA testing to exonerate people
wrongly convicted, former FBI director William S. Sessions wrote:
"There are always reasons-time, money, bureaucratic obstacles-that
something cannot be done. But when it comes to justice and fairness,
those reasons are just excuses."220
The excuse here-that outside researchers will corrupt or shut
down DNA databases-is similarly without merit.
215 Id.
216 Email from Katherine Philpott, Special Litigation and Forensics Fellow, Public Defender
Serv. for the Dist. of Columbia, to author (May 2, 2010, 22:11 PST) (on file with author).
217 Jefferson, supra note 135, at 33.
218Id.
219 Murphy, supra note 37, at 790-91 (citing 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/116-5 (2005) and
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-63 (2005)); DNA.gov, The Impact of DNA Testing, DNA Initiative,
http://www.dna.gov/postconviction/handling-requests/legalissues/impact-of-dna-testing
(last visited Apr. 16, 2010) (citing N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.30(1-a) (McKinney Supp.
1999); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/116-3(a) (West Supp. 1998)).
220 William S. Sessions, DNA Tests Can Free the Innocent. IHow Can We Ignore That?,
WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 2003, at B2.
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D. OFFENDER DNA DATABASEs ARE SUITABLE FOR STUDY
Government scientists have argued that criminal offender
databases cannot be studied.221 Geneticists and statisticians typically
work with DNA from discrete racial and ethnic categories, while DNA
databases contain profiles from diverse populations.222 FBI scientists
point out that offender databases hold the DNA of African Americans,
Asians, Caucasians, Hispanics, Native Americans, and Oceanians, and
"it is likely that the proportions of these groups in the database are not
the same as they are in the greater US population."223 The databases
also contain duplicate profiles and very close relatives, which would
tend to skew statistical results.224 Such factors make CODIS "an
extremely poor database to analyze" for the purpose of testing DNA
rarity assumptions, according to the FBI. 2 25
While the FBI points out legitimate complicating factors,
statistical methods can correct for them.226 These methods allowed
researchers to examine offender profiles from Virginia and North
Carolina to estimate the number of DNA markers necessary to identify
a single individual through a database search.227 Scientists used
samples from Illinois's offender population to create a database of
DNA profiles, and published those profiles in the Journal of Forensic





226 Decl. of Montgomery Slatkin, supra note 128. See also Letter from Keith Devlin, supra
note 29 (noting that the lack of randomness and other properties of DNA databases "in no
way pose[] a major obstacle to an analysis" and "reliable statistical techniques can be used
to make allowances for the peculiarities of the population represented in the database");
Letter from David Kaye, supra note 155 (arguing that "although these databases contain
unknown numbers of close relatives, which complicates the analysis, they have
considerable statistical power because of their size"); Mueller Decl. I, supra note 15
(arguing that "because of its size, quality and the availability of records on each sample,
[the national offender database] is well suited to empirical study").
227 Mueller, supra note 30, at 101.
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Science.228 Professor Laurence Mueller studied the Arizona matches,
using statistics to figure out whether factors other than incorrect
assumptions could account for them.229 Australian authorities opened
a local offender database to a scientist's scrutiny after finding a DNA
match that seemed to defy prevailing rarity statistics.23o
Moreover, some of the same FBI scientists who say database
profiles are unsuitable for scientific research have themselves used
database profiles in their research.231 Bruce Budowle, who once
headed the FBI's laboratory division at Quantico, Virginia, and is now
a professor at the University of North Texas, has consistently argued
against the scientific study of genetic information collected from
criminal offenders.232 Even so, he has used offenders' DNA samples
for his own research. In a study investigating the rarity of DNA from
three Native Alaskan populations, he and other FBI scientists wrote
that "the majority of the samples for this study were collected from
convicted offenders required to provide a DNA sample by Alaskan
Statute."233 To identify these offenders by ethnic affiliation, Budowle
and his team relied on the information provided by the offenders at
the time their samples were collected.234
Budowle and his co-authors are some of the same scientists who
emphasized the "privacy and confidentiality" of offender DNA profiles
in a 2009 paper opposing scientific research of this data set.235 While
research conducted by government scientists might pose less of a
privacy risk than that of outsiders, Budowle and his colleagues have
also claimed that offenders' DNA profiles can only yield "flawed" and
228 Id. (referring to W.E. Frank et al., Y Chromosome STR Haplotypes and Allele
Frequencies in Illinois Caucasian, African American, and Hispanic Males, 51 J. FORENSIC
SCI. 1207 (2oo6)).
229 Id.
230 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
231 See Bruce Budowle et al., supra note 194.
232 See, e.g., Budowle et al., supra note 43, at 6o; Ford Motion to Quash, supra note 32
(appended Clarification of Statistical Issues Related to the Operation of CODIS); Editors &
Editorial Board, Forensic Science Communications,
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/current/editors.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2010).
233 Budowle et al., supra note 194, at 52.
234 See id.
235 Budowle, supra note 43, at 6o.
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"misleading" results.236 Budowle and his co-author, Ranajit
Chakraborty, did not return calls and e-mails asking them to explain
why offender DNA profiles were nonetheless suitable for their Alaska
study.237
Other scientists say further study of offender databases could
answer persistent questions about DNA statistics. In a declaration in
support of an unsuccessful subpoena of the California database,
Professor Slatkin said that despite their heterogeneity, databases are
large enough that "great statistical power could be achieved from a
detailed analysis of them."238 Even California's more than one million
profiles-a fraction of the profiles in CODIS-could help test critical
assumptions about the rarity of DNA profiles, he said.239 A study of
the California DNA database would give researchers the benefit of
working with the data actually used to identify suspects, eliminating
the current dependence on disputed assumptions.240 As Keith Devlin,
a Stanford University mathematician, asked, "Why argue about what
might be when we can know for sure what is?"241
The following part takes a closer look at DNA collection statutes
and finds that they do not forbid independent research.
236 Id.
237 E-mail from author to Bruce Budowle, Professor, Univ. of N. Texas (Mar. 2, 2010 14:32
PST); E-mail from author to Bruce Budowle, Dir., Lab. Div., FBI, Quantico, Va. (Mar. 16,
2009 13:09 PST); E-mail from author to Ranajit Chakraborty, Professor, Ctr. for Genome
Info., Univ. of Cincinnati (Mar. 16, 2009 13:09 PST); Voice Mail Message to Bruce
Budowle, Dir., Lab. Div., FBI, Quantico, Va. (Feb. 27, 2009); E-mail from author to Bruce
Budowle, Dir., Lab. Div., FBI, Quantico, Va. (Feb 27, 2009 11:12 PST); Voice Mail Message
to Ranajit Chakraborty, Professor, Ctr. for Genome Info., Univ. of Cincinnati (Feb. 27,
2009); E-mail from author to Ranajit Chakraborty, Professor, Ctr. for Genome Info., Univ.
of Cincinnati (Feb. 27, 2009 11:22 PST).
238 Decl. of Montgomery Slatkin, supra note 128.
239 Id. Publicly available genetic databases are much smaller than offender databases, and
thus less fruitful for study. Mueller Decl. II, supra note 15, at 2-3 (pointing out that a
17,ooo-person database, the largest publicly available, is "relatively small").
240 Letter from Prof. Keith Devlin, supra note 29.
241 Id. (emphasis in original).
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III. DNA DATABASE STATUTES ALLOW
DISCLOSURE OF OFFENDERS' DNA
This part will analyze federal and state DNA database statutes to
determine whether Congress or the California Legislature
contemplated non-government access to forensic DNA profiles.
Government officials argue that state and federal law prohibit this
access, at least in the context of a criminal trial, 242 but a close look at
these statutes show that they do not call for total secrecy.
A. THE FEDERAL DNA DATABASE STATUTE DOES NOT
REQUIRE TOTAL SECRECY
The FBI built CODIS to link DNA databases across jurisdictions.243
The FBI learned the importance of interconnectivity from its work
with fingerprint databases, which local and state governments
maintain in independent and incompatible systems. 244 In CODIS, law
enforcement officials built a DNA network in which local and state law
enforcement agencies could maintain their own records, while still
allowing each other to access them.
In 42 U.S.C. § 14132, Congress authorized the FBI director to set
up a network of databases containing DNA profiles collected from
people convicted of or charged with crimes, or people whose DNA
samples are collected under state or local law.245 The statute limits
CODIS membership to federal, state, and local criminal justice
agencies that keep secret the genetic information they collect.246
However, the statute authorizes disclosure of DNA samples and
242 Ford Motion to Quash, supra note 32, at 7, 9; Letter from Dwight E. Adams, Dir., Lab.
Div., FBI, to Todd Griffith, Designated State Official, Ariz. Dep't of Pub. Safety (Mar. 17,
2oo6) (on file with author).
243Finn, supra note 66.
244 Id.
25 42 U.S.C.A. § 14132(a)(1) (West 2010).
246 42 U.S.C.A. § 14132(b)(3) (West 2010). The Secretary of Defense is also a member of
CODIS. Id. Unauthorized disclosure or use of offender DNA information is a crime
punishable by a $250,000 fine or a year in prison. 42 U.S.C. § 14135e(c) (West 2010).
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profiles under certain circumstances.247 Generally, those
circumstances include: (i) statistical research and quality control, (2)
judicial proceedings, (3) criminal trials, and (4) law enforcement use
by criminal justice agencies.248 The last category is not an exception
that involves disclosure of offenders' DNA and will not be discussed.
The CODIS statute's first confidentiality exception allows
disclosure of offenders' DNA for statistical research and quality
control purposes, provided that personally identifiable information is
removed.249 The statute does not define "quality control," but
associates it with "identification research and protocol development"
and the creation of "a population statistics database."25o Thus, if the
CODIS database really is unsuitable for population genetics research
due to duplicates in the system and the presence of family members,251
the statute's statistical research and quality control exception
authorizes the use of offenders' DNA samples to create a new
population statistics database from scratch.252 If the offender
database turns out to be suitable for research, the statute would seem
to authorize such research as a matter of general "quality control" and
specific "identification research and protocol development."
The FBI rejects this reading of the quality-control exception. In a
letter denying sixteen scientists' request for access to the profiles
within CODIS, D. Christian Hassell, director of the FBI laboratory,
wrote that this exception is applicable only to criminal justice
agencies.253 For support, Hassell cited a December 2000 resolution of
the Federal DNA Advisory Board.254 The Advisory Board said that
"samples should only be used by [law enforcement] in accordance
24742 U.S.C.A. § 14132(b)(3)(A)-(D) (2010). See also 14135e(b) (2010) (referring to
"permissive uses" of offender genetic information described in 42 U.S.C. § 14132(b)(3)(A)-
(D) (West 2010)).
24842 U.S.C.A. § 14132(b)(3)(A)-(D) (West 2010).
24942 U.S.C.A. § 14132(b)(3)(D) (West 2010).
250 Id.
251 See Budowle, supra note 43, at 6o.
252 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 14132(b)(3)(D) (West 2010).
253 Letter from D. Christian Hassell, supra note 50, at 1.
254 Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 14131(a)(1)(West 2010).
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with the DNA Identification Act of 1994."255 Hassell reads the
sentence to say that the samples should be used only by law
enforcement, period. But a more natural reading of the sentence
shows that "only" modifies "in accordance with the DNA Identification
Act of 1994."256 The Advisory Board was merely emphasizing the
primacy of the CODIS statute, not restricting access to CODIS's
contents. Thus law enforcement must follow the CODIS statute, not
keep the contents of CODIS to itself.
Hassell also emphasizes that CODIS is limited to the "single use"
of law enforcement identification.257 Research into the statistical
rarity of DNA profiles conforms with this single use. A Judiciary
Committee report that Hassell cites says the CODIS statute "does not
purport to resolve" statistical questions.258 Instead, it creates an
exception allowing law enforcement and scientists to work together to
ensure the integrity of DNA evidence. When the CODIS statute
passed, a major problem with DNA evidence was a lack of uniform
procedures among laboratories feeding profiles into the system. 25 9
Congress likely wrote the CODIS statute's quality control exception in
general terms in order to give law enforcement the flexibility to
respond to future crises of confidence.
The CODIS statute's second exception "allow[s] disclosure of
stored DNA samples and DNA analyses...in judicial proceedings, if
otherwise admissible pursuant to applicable statutes or rules."26 0 A
later statutory section defines "DNA analysis" as the analysis of DNA
in a bodily sample, which would seem to refer to DNA profiles, not
analyses of databases.26 1 The grammar of the judicial proceedings
exception suggests that the limiting "statutes or rules" refer to
whether DNA is admissible evidence, not whether other statutes or
rules allow DNA to be released in a judicial proceeding at all.26 2 This
255 Letter from D. Christian Hassell, supra note 50, at 2.
256 See id.
257 Id. at 1-2.
258 Id. at 1 (citing H.R. Doe. No. 103-45 (1993)).
259 H.R. Doc. No. 103-45 (1993).
260 42 U.S.CA. § 14132(b)(3)(B) (West aoio).
26'42 U.S.C.A. § 14135a(c)(2) (West 2010).
2 6
2 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 14132(b)(3)(B) (West 2oio).
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exception puts no limits on who can receive offenders' DNA samples
and profiles once they are released in a judicial proceeding.
Therefore, this exception likely authorizes the judge-ordered
production of offender DNA samples and profiles irrespective of who
analyzes them.263 The only limitation seems to be whether this
information is admissible evidence.
The CODIS statute's third exception authorizes some disclosure of
forensic DNA to criminal defendants at trial.264 It allows law
enforcement to release DNA samples and profiles "for criminal
defense purposes, to a defendant, who shall have access to samples
and analyses performed in connection with the case in which such a
defendant is charged."265 As noted earlier, "DNA analyses" likely refer
to DNA profiles.266 Thus while the plain language of the statute reads
as though it could include database searches, this subsection likely
limits criminal defendants to the DNA samples and profiles that link
him or her to the crime charged.26 7
It could be that this express authorization of disclosure to criminal
defendants precludes disclosure of DNA profiles in a criminal case
under the judicial proceedings exception. However, Congress would
likely have used the words "civil proceedings" rather than "judicial
proceedings" if it had intended this result.268  Furthermore, this
construction could render the judicial proceedings exception
meaningless. Offender DNA profiles are likely relevant to very few
judicial proceedings other than criminal trials. They could be of
interest to criminal defendants as plaintiffs in civil cases challenging
the forensic DNA program's constitutionality, but these suits are
discouraged because criminal defendants would have to submit to
depositions and lose criminal trial rights. Thus if the CODIS statute
limits disclosure of offender DNA profiles in criminal cases to what is
allowed under the criminal trials exception, the judicial proceedings
263 See id.
26442 U.S.C.A. § 14132(b)(3)(C) (West 2010).
265 Id.
266 42 U.S.C.A. § 14135a(c)(2) (West 2010).
267 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 14132(b)(3)(C) (West 2oio). This is the FBI's interpretation. Letter
from Dwight E. Adams, supra note 242 ("The FBI has never interpreted [the criminal
defense exception] to permit the defense access to all of the DNA records at the National
Index or the performance of any searches.").
268 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 14132(b)(3)(B) (West 2010).
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language is effectively moot.269 Canons of statutory interpretation
argue against this result, leading to the conclusion that the criminal
defense exception is the minimum disclosure to which only criminal
defendants are entitled, and the judicial proceedings exception is
permissive in all cases.2 70
The FBI rejects this position. In a letter admonishing Arizona's
crime lab for complying with a court order in a criminal case
authorizing the study the state's offender DNA database, Dwight
Adams, director of the FBI's laboratory division, referenced only the
criminal defense exception in defining what database information the
state can make available to criminal defendants.271 While Adams
might correctly read the criminal defense exception to bar defendants
from running database searches or obtaining copies of the database,
his letter ignores the judicial proceedings exception, which authorizes
such disclosures if a judge orders them.272 He also ignores the
statistical research and quality control exception.273
Congress expressly authorized population genetics studies of
offender databases.274 These studies could be done in a variety of
ways, according to the CODIS statute-through internal quality
control, outside research, or within judicial proceedings.275 This
article advocates the outside research approach in order to ensure
credible results and insulate researchers from the pressures of the
adversarial criminal justice system.276  However, the federal CODIS
269 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 14132(b)(3)(B)-(C) (West 2010).
270 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 14132(b)(3)(C) (West 2010).
271 Letter from Dwight E. Adams, supra note 242.
272 Id.
273 Id.
274 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 14132(b)(3)(D) (West 2010).
275 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 14132(b)(3)(B), (D) (West 2010).
276 The NAS acknowledged these pressures by recommending the creation of a new agency
outside of the Department of Justice (DOJ) to control forensic science funding and
research. NAS REPORT, supra note 54, at 19. Professor Paul Giannelli calls this a
"controversial but needed reform." Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert and Forensic Science: The
Pitfalls of Law Enforcement Control of Scientific Research 6 (Case Research Paper Series
in Legal Studies, Paper No. 2010-6, aolo). DOJ, the FBI Crime Lab, and some prosecutors
"have attempted to shape science by controlling the research agenda, hiding unwelcome
test results, attacking legitimate studies that were considered unfavorable, harassing
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statute allows all judge-supervised database research as long as the
results are admissible evidence.277
B. CALIFORNIA'S DNA DATABASE LAw DOES NOT
REQUIRE TOTAL SECRECY
Notwithstanding possible avenues of disclosure under federal law,
state law governs state databases. California law on this point is
similar to federal law: it commands that all DNA profiles and samples
be kept secret unless certain exceptions apply.278 These exceptions
include: (1) administrative or judicial proceedings;279 (2) training,
research, statistical analysis of populations, quality assurance, or
quality control;28 0 (3) criminal trials;281 and (4) law enforcement
use. 2 82 The last category does not involve disclosure of DNA evidence
outside of law enforcement, and will not be discussed here.
Like the federal statute, California law allows disclosure of DNA
database information in judicial proceedings.28 3 However, the
California statute leaves such disclosures to the discretion of law
enforcement as long as the information disclosed "pertains to the
basis" for identifying, arresting, investigating, prosecuting, or
excluding a person related to the case.284 The exception explicitly
forbids courts from compelling disclosure of "any" database
information "in a criminal or civil proceeding ... whether by subpoena
scientists who disagreed with them, and 'spinning' these issues in the press." Id. at 7.
Professor Giannelli's article chronicles these misdeeds.
277 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 14132(b)(3)(B) (West 2010).
278 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 299.5(a) (West 2010). Unauthorized use or disclosure of DNA
profiles is a crime punishable by fine or imprisonment. CAL. PENAL CODE § 299-5(i) (West
2010).
279 CAL. PENAL CODE § 299.5(k) (West 2010); CAL. PENAL CODE § 299.5(h) (West 2oio).
28 o CAL. PENAL CODE § 299.5(m) (West 2010). See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 299.6(a)(5)
(West 2010).
281 CAL. PENAL CODE § 299.5(g), (j) (West 2010).
28 2 CAL. PENAL CODE § 299.5(f) (West 2010).




or discovery."285 This likely blocks judge-ordered searches or
supervised defense-expert research, while leaving open such measures
DOJ should undertake voluntarily.286 Yet voluntary action seems
unlikely given DOJ's opposition to DNA database research.28 7
The California statute also mirrors federal law by allowing
disclosure of offender database information for research and quality
control purposes.28 California's DNA database law allows DOJ to use
"anonymous records or criminal history information" for training,
research, statistical analysis of populations, quality assurance, or
quality control.289 The law says that DOJ, its agent, or a local public
laboratory can use this information for statistical analysis, authorizing
DOJ to conduct the research itself, or to allow outsiders to do it.290If
it turns out that DNA profiles and samples do not qualify as "records
or criminal history information," a later statutory section makes clear
that DOJ has the discretion to share or disseminate a range of
information relating to offender DNA databases, including DNA
profiles.291 Under this section, state authorities could deliver the
offender database to "any third party that [DOJ] deems necessary to
assist the department's crime laboratory with statistical analysis of
population databases."292 Therefore, California law allows DOJ to
conduct statistical research of the database, whether internally or by
an outside researcher.
The third exception governs criminal trials.293 State authorities
are required to release DNA and other forensic identification
information to a defendant in preparation for trial.294 Unlike the
285 CAL. PENAL CODE § 299.5(h) (West 2010) (noting that the purpose of secrecy is to
"protect the confidentiality and privacy of database and data bank information").
286 See id.
287See e.g., Ford Motion to Quash, supra note 32; Davis Motion to Quash, supra note 158.




9 CAL. PENAL CODE § 299.5(m) (West 2010).
290 See id.
291 CAL. PENAL CODE § 299.6(a) (West 2010).
292 CAL. PENAL CODE § 299.6(a)(5) (West 2010).
293 CAL. PENAL CODE §299.5(g), (j) (West 2010).
294 CAL. PENAL CODE § 299.5(g), () (West 2010).
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federal statute, where the express authorization of disclosure to
criminal defendants in a criminal trial could preclude their use of the
judicial proceedings exception, California's judicial proceedings
exception mentions the "grand jury" and "prosecution," making clear
that it applies to criminal trials.295 Thus California's criminal trials
exception, which commands law enforcement to release some DNA
information, is the baseline of disclosure upon which the judicial
proceedings exception builds.
If DOJ does not use its discretion to allow scientists to study the
rarity of DNA profiles using California's offender database, the
constitutionality of California's DNA database statute could be
questioned.296  Unlike the federal statute, which allows courts to
release DNA database information in judicial proceedings,297
California law leaves such disclosures to the discretion of law
enforcement.298  It thereby blocks the only external means of
addressing the deficiencies of (1) using databases to identify
defendants without providing them a means to refute the
identification; and (2) presenting rarity statistics that might not be
accurate. If DOJ refuses to use its discretion to allow third-party
evaluations of DNA databases, the portion of California's database law
that prohibits court-ordered database research could be struck
down.299
IV. AGENCIES SHOULD RELEASE OFFENDER DNA PROFILES TO
RESEARCHERS USING SAFEGUARDS IN PLACE IN OTHER CONTEXTS
As Part III demonstrates, the dearth of statistical research using
offenders' DNA profiles is a matter of law enforcement prerogative
rather than law. This part explores three contexts in which
government discloses sensitive information about individuals: (1)
through the California Public Records Act, (2) during trials, and (3) to
independent researchers. It then evaluates each and determines that
295 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 299.5(k).
296 See supra note 48.
297 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 14132(b)(3)(B) (West 2010).
298 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 299.5(k) (West 2010).




the independent research model is the most suitable for scientific
study of offenders' DNA profiles.
A. THE CALIFORNIA PUBLIC RECORDS ACT COMPELS DISCLOSURE OF
ARIZONA SEARCH RESULTS
The California Public Records Act can be a powerful tool for
discovering information generally considered private. For example, it
has been used to compel disclosure of state and local government
payroll information, identifying public employees with the money they
make.300 It can penetrate personnel files, unveiling misconduct
complaints against public employees.301
However, the California Public Records Act is not boundless.
While it "declares that access to information concerning the conduct
of the people's business is a fundamental and necessary right," it
exempts some information from disclosure.302 Law enforcement
intelligence and investigatory information is one exemption.3o3
The California DOJ cited the law enforcement disclosure
exemption when it rejected a Public Records Act request the author
submitted seeking information about California's offender DNA
database.3o4 The author asked the state for "records and
documentation" of DNA matches between individuals within the
offender database; these would include numerical and profile results
of an Arizona search, a chance discovery in the course of an
300 See, e.g., Press Release, UCSF, UC Employee Compensation Made Available to Public
(Oct. 10, 2007), http://today.ucsf.edu/stories/uc-employee-compensation-made-
available-to-public/.
301 See, e.g., Bakersfield City Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court, 118 Cal. App. 4th 1041 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2004) (upholding a lower court decision to make public sexual misconduct
complaints against a former middle school vice principal suspected of killing his family).
302 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 6250 (West 2010).
303 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 6254(f) (West 2010).
3 California courts have not yet ruled on the specific question of whether offenders'
genetic information-samples or profiles or both-is subject to disclosure under the Act.
However, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that DNA samples from a rape case were not
subject to disclosure under the Virginia Freedom of Information Act. Globe Newspaper
Co. v. Com., 570 S.E.2d 809 (Va. 2002). In that case, several newspapers seeking to
re-test DNA from a decades-old rape and murder for which a man was convicted and
put to death petitioned the court for access to the evidence. Id at 810-11.
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investigation, or quality control research.305 If these records "were to
exist," DOJ said, they would be exempt from disclosure under the
Public Records Act.306 What follows is an analysis of DOJ's arguments
for rejecting the author's request.
First, DOJ said DNA match information is "confidential and
exempt from disclosure."3o7 In ACLU Foundation v. Deukmejian, the
California Supreme Court held that law enforcement data consisting
of "personal identifiers, confidential sources, and confidential
information relating to criminal activity" is exempt intelligence
information under the California Public Records Act.308 There the
ACLU was concerned about an index card system police used to
monitor organized crime, a system that tracked suspects' "associates,"
such as family members, business acquaintances, and their
attorneys. 30 9 Each card listed the associate's name, alias, occupation,
family members, vehicles, associates, arrests, modus operandi, and
physical traits.31o This information was exempt from disclosure under
the California Public Records Act, the court held, as is (1) any
"information which might lead the knowledgeable or inquisitive to
infer the identity of the individual in question," or (2) "information
supplied in confidence."311 The court based its decision in part on the
fact that while the ACLU sought to uncover government abuses, the
records could also be used for "less noble purposes."312
Under ACLU Foundation, DOJ is likely correct that the California
Public Records Act prohibits general disclosure of offender DNA
305 Letter from Jill Spriggs, Chief, Bureau of Forensic Servs., Cal. Dep't of Justice, to author
(July 28, 20o8) (on file with author). The author did not ask for a copy of the contents of
California's entire offender database. Id. Given the state's denial of the author's request for
matching profiles, or numbers of matches, this request would likely have been denied.
3o6 Id.
307 Id.
308 ACLU Found. v. Deukmejian, 32 Cal.3d 440, 452 (Cal. 1982).
309 Id. at 444 (noting that in attacking the index card system, the ACLU "cites a striking
example of the potential for abuse in unmonitored gathering of information by law
enforcement agencies"). For example, a state senator was listed as an associate of a Black
Panther Party member who had rented the senator's house for four months. Id.
310 Id.




profiles. First, offenders supply them to law enforcement in
confidence insofar as DNA collection statutes limit their disclosure to
circumstances that do not include broad public dissemination.
Second, they identify people, albeit to a lesser degree than the name or
alias records in ACLU Foundation.313 And law enforcement officials
have long argued that DNA profiles are junk, useful for identification
only if names are attached.314 However, even if offenders' profiles
were stripped of identifying information, someone with the right
equipment and a copy of the offender database could swab a coffee
mug, profile the drinker's DNA, and search for a match. In California,
the most this would reveal is whether police had arrested the coffee
drinker for a felony. Despite the fact that adult arrest records are
public,3'5 this is a revelation likely prohibited by the court's
construction of the California Public Records Act.
DOJ also objected to revealing whether the offender DNA
database contained matching DNA profiles.316 This information is not
the kind of information kept secret in ACLU Foundation because
there is nothing personally identifying about the fact of a match.317
Furthermore, while DNA samples are provided to the government in
limited confidence, the number of matching profiles within the
offender database is not supplied to government-it is discovered by
government.
DOJ's second objection to the request was that a record of a DNA
match is exempt investigatory information because it is "a potential
lead in a case unsolved by other means."318 While DNA profiles
themselves are potential leads, the fact that the database contains
matches between individuals is not. Just because the DNA database is
fundamentally an investigatory tool, matches or associations within it
31 See id. at 444.
314 See supra notes 198-205 and surrounding text.
315 The Los Angeles Police Department website lists the various kinds of information
available to the public under the California Public Records Act. LAPD, California Public
Records Act, http://www.lapdonline.org/home/content basic-view/36329 (last visited
Apr. 17, 201o). The site lists arrest logs, 911 recordings, crime reports, accident reports, sex
offender registry files, local criminal history for an individual, warrant information, and
some juvenile records. Id.
316 See Letter from Jill Spriggs, supra note 305, at 2.
317 See ACLU Found., 32 Cal. 3d at 444.
318 Letter from Jill Spriggs, supra note 305.
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are not necessarily records of an investigation.319 If DOJ learned of
database matches while conducting an investigation, these matches
could be confidential records of that investigation, but if it learned of
them while conducting an Arizona search or statistical studies, they
would not be.
Finally, DOJ said that DNA database records are exempt from
disclosure under the Public Records Act provision that protects
information otherwise kept secret by federal or state statute.320 DOJ
says federal and state laws prohibit disclosure of DNA profiles and
matches within an offender database.321 While both levels of
government prohibit disclosure of DNA profiles and samples to the
public, precluding such a disclosure under the California Public
Records Act, the fact that matches exist at all is not secret.322 If such
matches exist, the fact that they do is a matter of public record under
California law.
B. SOME FINGERPRINT AND DNA SEARCH RECORDs ARE RELEASED
TO DEFENDANTS
Fingerprinting was the premier criminal identification procedure
before DNA came along.323 Fingerprints, like DNA profiles, are stored
in state-run databases, and technicians search them using the
Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS).324 A fingerprint
examiner scans latent prints lifted from crime scenes and uses
computer software to mark identifying characteristics of the print-
where ridges change direction, whorl, or loop.325 The positioning of
these markings is what the software uses to hunt through the
database, searching through prints of known offenders that have a
319 Id. at 2-3.
320 Id. at 3 (citing CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6254(k) (West 2010)).
321 Id.
322 See id.
323 See, e.g., Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence in an Age ofDNA Profiling, 67
BROOK. L. REV. 13,39-43 (2001).
324 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., A REVIEW OF THE FBI'S
Handling OF THE BRANDON MAYFIELD CASE, 118 (Mar. 2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/so6ol/PDFlist.htm.
325 Id. at 119.
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similar constellation of ridge markings.326 AFIS produces a list of
possible matches, and the lab technician sorts through them,
eliminating fingerprints that have a whorl where the crime-scene print
has a loop. 327 If an AFIS-produced print survives this round of
examination, the lab technician pulls original print cards and begins a
ridge-by-ridge comparison between the known print and the latent
print lifted from the crime scene.328
Criminal defense attorneys representing clients identified through
AFIS have argued that the list of prints flagged through an AFIS
search is exculpatory and thus discoverable under Brady v.
Maryland.329 Courts have rejected this argument,330 but a trial court
in New Jersey held that the results of an AFIS analysis qualify as a
scientific test under the state's criminal discovery rules, and must
therefore be turned over to the defense.331 The defendant's goal in
seeking AFIS results is to show "that there are other persons with a
match that is as close" to the crime-scene print as that of the
defendant.332 The court deemed this "relevant evidence [that] must be
given to the defendant."333
326 Id.
327 Id. at 120.
328 Id.
329 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); See Forensics Library, National Legal Aid &
Defender Association,
http://www.nlada.org/Defender/forensics/for_1ib/Index/Fingerprints/showHelp (last
visited Apr. 16, 2010) (recommending that defense attorneys file discovery requests for
AFIS results. Relevant questions to ask include: "Did the AFIS place your client's print in
the first position? If not, have the examiner explain why not? [sic] Does the examiner know
better than the computer? Have your defense examiner look at the database print that did
appear in the first position. Was the AFIS search run more than once? Were there
different results? What explains the different results?").
330 See, e.g., State v. Green, No. 90092, 2008 WL 2623959, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. July 3,
20o8); People v. Tims, No. Ao92799, 2002 WL 202477, at *11 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2002).
33' State v. Feldman, 604 A.2d 242, 244 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992). Despite the
importance of this evidence and the fact that it "must be given to the defendant," the court
held that its destruction was not in bad faith and that its unavailability was neither
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Turning to DNA, some courts have ordered Arizona searches, but
most have stopped short of releasing to defense attorneys all profiles
contained in offender DNA databases.334 However, in 1999, a trial
court judge in Colorado ordered the state to deliver the contents,
without names, of its 5,629-person database to defense attorneys as
discovery.335 The Colorado database was too small to do the kind of
large-scale statistical testing urged by scientists.
In California, attorneys defending DNA database cases can request
their clients' "hit file," which documents the DNA database search that
led authorities to the defendant.336 The hit file contains information
about how the DOJ lab handled the defendant's DNA, when it
uploaded the profile to the database system, when the local lab
uploaded the crime-scene sample, the letter DOJ sent to the local
crime lab notifying it of a hit, and records of DOJ's re-analysis of the
defendant's sample to double-check the match.337 In rare cases, a
database search identifies more than one offender as a potential
match to the crime-scene profile, said DOJ attorney Michael
Chamberlain.338 Like AFIS, DNA database software does not look only
for perfect matches.339 In the case of more than one matching profile,
defense attorneys would find out through the hit file, according to
Chamberlain.340 Additionally, he observed that if a defense attorney
questioned the local lab's determination that other offenders
identified through the database search could not have contributed the
crime-scene sample, the attorney could seek these offenders' profiles
in discovery.341 Whether profiles determined to be non-matches are
discoverable is adjudicated on a case-by-case basis. The disclosure of
profiles would allow defense attorneys to see for themselves why state
DNA analysts determined that the defendant's profile matched the
33See supra note 32.
335 E-mail from Steve Jacobson, supra note 32.
336 E-mail from Michael Chamberlain, Deputy Attorney Gen., Cal. Dep't of Justice, to








crime-scene evidence and the others' did not. Finally, prosecutors
also release DNA profiles, with names, where police-not databases-
identify multiple suspects, test their DNA, and find that only one
matches the crime-scene profile.342
The disclosures mentioned above, while potentially useful to
individual defendants, do not reach the integrity of DNA statistics.
The next part examines how California uses sensitive data sets to
conduct large-scale research.
C. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DISSEMINATE INFANTS' DNA TO
MEDICAL RESEARCHERS
Government agencies share sensitive information about
individuals in the context of medical and social science research.343
Again, this article will use California as a case study.
In California, government agencies that collect personal
information may release it to the University of California or other
non-profit educational institutions for research purposes.344 These
releases must be approved by the Committee for the Protection of
Human Subjects (CPHS), a division of the California Health and
Human Services Agency.345 A snapshot of CPHS-approved studies
ongoing as of June 2oo8 shows CPHS overseeing 449 projects in
which researchers were using state databases containing personal
information about individuals.346 Of about two dozen genetic research
projects among them, nine used state-collected blood samples from
newborns.347 The newborn screening program the only state-run
342 E-mail from Michael Chamberlain, Deputy Attorney Gen., Cal. Dep't of Justice, to
author (Mar. 12, 2010 12:01 PST) (on file with author).
4See E-mail from Roxana Killian, Adm'r, Comm. for the Protection of Hum. Subjects
(CPHS), to author (Feb. 25, 2009 14:31 PST) (on file with author) (including attached
spreadsheets showing 449 research projects using state databases as of June 2008; nearly
all of them are medical or social science studies).
344 CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1798.24(t) (West 2010).
345 Id.
346 See E-mail from Roxana Killian, supra note 380.
347 Lisa Croen, Prenatal and Neonatal Biologic Markers for Autism (July 2, 2008)
(unpublished research protocol for study by Kaiser Permanente Div. of Research) (on file
with author); Judith K. Grether, Candidate Genes for Childhood Autism (July 13,2007)
(unpublished research protocol for study by Cal. Dep't of Public Health) (on file with
author); Martin Kharrazi, Molecular Markers of Preterm Birth-Maternal and Infant
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genetic registry in which participation is mandatory; state law says all
parents must allow their children to give a blood sample unless they
object on religious grounds.348 Once collected, the samples belong to
the state, which may release them to state agencies and academic or
nonprofit researchers seeking to do certain kinds of health research.349
If researchers breach confidentiality requirements, the person affected
can seek as much as $1o,ooo in compensatory and civil damages, plus
attorney fees and the cost of litigation.350
Researchers with a department's permission to analyze
individuals' personal information, including genetic samples from the
newborn screening program, must also seek approval and subsequent
review from CPHS.351 Organizations eligible for approval are limited
Genetic Contributions to Preterm Birth: The Inflammatory Response (Aug. 25, 2oo8)
(unpublished research protocol for study by Cal. Dep't of Public Health) (on file with
author); Martin Kharrazi, An Examination of Unexplained Courses of Early Child Mortality
and the Value of Newborn Screening (July 22, 2008) (unpublished research protocol for
study by Cal. Dep't of Public Health) (on file with author); Martin Kharrazi, An Assessment
of the Incidence of Cytomegalovirus Infection in Newborns in California (Feb. 28, 2008)
(unpublished research protocol for study by Cal. Dep't of Public Health) (on file with
author); Martin Kharrazi, Tobacco Exposure in Pregnant Women in Minority Populations
(Mar. 2, 2004) (unpublished research protocol for study by Cal. Dep't of Public Health) (on
file with author); Martin Kharrazi, An Assessment of the Seroprevalence of HCV Infection
in Childbearing Women in San Diego, Orange and Imperial Counties (Sept. 4, 2002)
(unpublished research protocol for study by Cal. Dep't of Public Health) (on file with
author); Roberta McKean-Cowdin, Gene-Environment Factors in Childhood Brain Tumors
(Jan. 2007) (unpublished research protocol for study by Univ. of S. Cal. Norris Cancer Ctr.)
(on file with author); Gayle Windham, Autism and Peri-natal Hormone Markers (July 6,
20o6) (unpublished research protocol for study by Cal. Dep't of Public Health) (on file with
author).
348 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1249751), 125000 (West 2010); Bradford L. Therrell
et al., Status ofNewborn Screening Programs in the United States, 117 PEDIATRICS S212,
S23o (2006). All states and the District of Columbia collect newborns' blood to screen for
diseases, and each state imposes its own consent and opt-out requirements. Id. at S212.
349 Id. at S231.
350 Id.
35' Until 2005, CPHS oversaw only Health and Human Services Agency research. See
Governor Schwarzenegger Signs Legislation to Fight Identity Theft, STATES NEWS
SERVICE, Sept. 22, 2005. In 2005, the California legislature amended the Information
Practices Act to require CPHS to approve scientific research proposals before any agency
discloses personal information to researchers. Id. The impetus for this change came in
2004, when a visiting economics researcher at UC Berkeley was hacked, potentially
compromising 6oo,ooo Californians' Social Security numbers and other personal data.
Keay Davidson, BERKELEY; Researcher Says Hacked Data Stored Properly, S.F.
CHRON., Oct. 23, 2004, at B2. The researcher was studying the impact of wages and
benefits upon the state's ability to recruit and retain in-home health care workers. Id.
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to the University of California or a nonprofit educational institution
conducting scientific research.352 To get CPHS's approval, the
researcher must: (1) submit a plan that includes administrative,
physical, and technical safeguards designed to protect personal data
from improper use and disclosure;353 (2) submit a plan to destroy or
return all personal information when it is no longer needed, or a long-
term plan for protecting the information;354 and (3) promise in writing
that the personal information will not be reused, disclosed, or used in
an unauthorized manner.35 CPHS then determines whether the
information requested is the minimum necessary to do the
research.356 If the research requires Social Security numbers, the law
says they must be encrypted.357 Moreover, if feasible-meaning if cost,
time, and technical expertise permit-California law requires the state
agency holding the data to process it for researchers in order to
minimize the disclosure of personal information.s 8
Unlike the public records and criminal trial contexts, California's
system of disseminating newborn genetic information depends upon
the cooperation of government agencies. It does not contain a
mechanism through which state officials might be compelled to
consider whether offender DNA profiles are analogous to infants' DNA
samples and should be released in the same way. However, a court
could decide that the constitutional rights of defendants require large-
scale statistical research of offender DNA databases, or law
enforcement agencies could follow Australia's lead by releasing
offender databases to outside researchers for study. The next section
examines how best to handle DNA profiles if they are released.
352 CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1798.24(t)(1) (West 2010).
353 CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1798.24(t)(1)(A) (West 2010).
354 CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1798.24(t)(1)(B) (West 2010).
355 CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1798.24(t)(1)(C) (West 2010).
3s6 CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1798.24(t)(2)(A)-(C) (West 2010).
357 CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1798.24(t)(2)(D) (West 2010).
358 CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1798.24(t)(2)(E) (West 2010).
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D. NEWBORN GENETIC RESEARCH PROVIDES THE BEST MODEL FOR
RELEASING SENSITIVE INFORMATION, AND COURTS OR LAWMAKERS
SHOULD IMPLEMENT A SIMILAR PROCEDURE FOR DNA
The most appropriate way for experts to study offender DNA
profiles is to release them through a process similar to California's
system of facilitating medical and social science research. While some
information about offender databases should be made available
through open-records laws, DNA profiles are personally identifying
enough to warn against entrusting them to the general public.
Furthermore, access to the statistical information contained in
criminal offender databases should not depend on the insistence of a
defendant's lawyer, the quality of a defense expert, or the whim of a
single judge.
Criminal trials are the most convenient places to raise questions
about the rarity of DNA profiles,359 but they are not designed to
answer them. The history of forensic DNA evidence is marked by
mistakes, and "for nearly every laboratory mistake or malfeasant act,
there were lawyers and judges who failed to catch it."360 As Law
Professor Erin Murphy points out, the technical complexity of DNA
evidence makes "close and continuous judicial scrutiny of their
methodological soundness less likely."361 Well-meaning judges might
be intimidated by the science involved, or wary of taking action that is
seemingly contrary to the vast majority of courts that have accepted
forensic DNA as legitimate courtroom evidence.362 In addition,
359 See supra note 32.
360 Murphy, supra note 37, at 767. Professor Erin Murphy points out courtroom missteps,
including an expert testifying that he had never heard of a case in which unrelated
individuals matched at three or four DNA markers. Id. She also notes that in Virginia and
Texas, people were "wrongly jailed ... for years on the basis of falsely inculpating DNA
evidence." Id. (citing, for example, Steve McVicker, More DPS Labs Flawed: DNA Testing
Woes Across State Threaten Thousands of Cases, HOUSTON CH RON., Mar. 27, 2004, at Al;
Adam Liptak, You Think DNA Evidence is Foolproof? Try Again, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16,
2003, §4, at 5).
361 Id. at 768.
362 Id. at 769. In United States v. Plaza, withdrawn from bound volume but available at
2002 WL 27305 (E.D. Pa. 2002), a trial court held some fingerprint evidence to be
insufficiently reliable. Id. The trial court encountered so much ridicule that it reversed
itself despite significant scholarship supporting its initial position. Id. at 768 n.205 (citing
United States v. Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549,1576 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (vacaing earlier opinion)).
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releasing the offender database to individual criminal defendants,
while potentially useful to their defense,363 is inefficient because it
burdens courts and attorneys without taking on what is potentially a
systemic problem: whether DNA statistics used in all DNA cases are
correct.
Bicka Barlow, a San Francisco defense attorney who initiated the
original Arizona search litigation and continues to push for access to
California's offender profiles, acknowledges that lawsuits are not ideal
for answering the questions raised by DNA evidence.364 Battling it out
in court "should not necessarily be how it works," she said.365 The
inertia of the courts make them slow to confront possible problems
with DNA evidence, she said, and "so much of [whether the issue gets
raised and whether judges take it seriously] depends on the quality of
the lawyering."366
If statistical research of offender DNA profiles is left to the
adversarial criminal justice system, answers to questions about the
rarity of DNA evidence will be slow in coming, if at all. Courts might
not feel comfortable questioning DNA evidence, and defense attorneys
seldom have the expertise to challenge it. Even if attorneys did have
the expertise, they might "reasonably conclude that it requires too
great an effort, and reaps too little a reward, to study such evidence in
the hopes of uncovering a flawed methodological approach."367 As
Professor Erin Murphy points out, defense attorneys' time might be
better spent working on a defense compatible with the evidence, or
negotiating a good plea deal for their client.36 8
If an individual criminal case is not the appropriate place to deal
with questions about DNA evidence, universities are. Medical
researchers interested in the ethical issues involved in conducting
363 For example, defense experts could search the database for near misses and argue that a
relative of the near miss is plausibly the perpetrator. Or the defense could search the
database for other matches in an attempt to show that DNA matches are more common
than DNA statistics seem to suggest.
364 Telephone Interview with Bicka Barlow, Attorney, S.F. Office of the Pub. Defender (Feb.
24, 2009). Barlow was one of John Puckett's defense attorneys. Smith, supra note 4, at
66.
365 Telephone Interview with Bicka Barlow, supra note 364.
366Id.
367 Murphy, supra note 37, at 77o.
368 Id. at 7i.
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genetic research on newborn DNA samples acknowledge that "concern
for confidentiality continues to fuel the ethical debate over public
health benefits versus personal privacy."369 Substitute "criminal
justice benefits" for "public health benefits," and this statement
encapsulates the issue at hand: whether assuring the integrity of the
criminal justice system outweighs possible privacy issues involved in
allowing outside researchers to study offender DNA databases. It
does. In California, the public health benefits of releasing newborns'
DNA samples to researchers outweigh infants' personal privacy.37o
Given that courts have consistently held that offenders have a
diminished privacy interest in their identifying information,371 the
countervailing public interest in the accuracy of DNA statistics wins
out here.372
It is true that neonatal blood samples are collected at least in part
for their research potential, while offenders' DNA samples are not.
Professors David Lazer and Viktor Mayer-Schonberger argue against
using offenders' DNA in ways not intended at the time of collection.373
However, some collateral uses, such as quality control, "certainly
support the core purpose of the collected data," they say.374 Such uses
call for "flexible rules...coupled with oversight mechanisms."375
369 Bradford L. Therrell et al., Guidelines for the Retention, Storage and Use of Residual
Dried Blood Spot Samples After Newborn Screening Analysis: Statement of the Council of
Regional Networks for Genetic Services, 57 BIOCHEMICAL & MOLECULAR MED. 116, 120
(1996).
370 See Therrell et al., supra note 348, at S231.
371 See, e.g., United States v. Kreisel, 508 F.3d 941, 948 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 12-13 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Kincade, 379 F-3d 813,835,
837-38 (9th Cir. 2004).
372 Professor David Kaye argues that while the right to informed consent is implicated in
the collection of personal information for medical or scientific research, this right "does not
apply when samples are legally compelled and the information extracted from them is used
solely to ensure that the very system that justifies this disclosure is working as it should."
Kaye, supra note 33, at 30.
373 See David Lazer & Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, Statutory Frameworks for Regulating
Information Flows: Drawing Lessons for the DNA Data Banks from Other Government





Flexible rules and oversight mechanisms characterize California's
system for allowing scientists to study newborns' DNA samples.376
The system is flexible because CPHS approves research protocols on a
case-by-case basis, evaluating each project's proposed means of
protecting sensitive information about individuals. Oversight is
achieved through regular reports to CPHS. A review of these reports
shows that they address the same issues that tend to stymie research
of offender databases-privacy and security.377 For example,
University of Southern California scientists using genetic information
to study the environmental factors associated with childhood brain
tumors assured CPHS in their report that while loss of confidentiality
is a possibility, the scientists use intensive security measures. 378
These include passwords, locked cabinets, allowing access to
information on a need-to-know basis, and a practice of storing genetic
information separately from identifying information.379 Even if a
breach were to occur, the researchers wrote, their work examines
portions of the genome that do not code for stigmatizing traits.380
If these kinds of measures are sufficiently protective of genetic
samples, they should be more than adequate to safeguard the release
of DNA profiles-strings of numbers useful for little more than
differentiating among individuals.38' In other words, if CPHS
oversight is not enough to protect offender profiles, it is not enough to
protect children's DNA samples. If that is the case, all genetic
research using newborns' samples should stop until the state has
enough confidence in its means of protecting privacy to allow genetic
research of every kind to continue. This would be devastating to
important genetic research, but the state cannot tout its privacy
system with regard to newborns and dismiss it as inadequate for
dealing with known offenders.
376 While this article assumes CPHS oversight to be as robust as it appears on paper, it is
plagued by low staffing levels. See E-mail from Roxana Killian, Adm'r, CPHS (Feb. 27,
2009, 09:34 PST) (on file with author).
377 See supra Part II(B).
378 Roberta McKean-Cowdin, Gene-Environment Factors in Childhood Brain Tumors 3
(Jan. 2007) (unpublished research protocol, on file with author).
379 Id.
380Md
381 Even if DNA profiles turn out to code for traits, the most an offender database will
reveal is whether offenders do or do not have those traits.
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The difference between the way California handles newborns'
genetic information and offenders' DNA profiles is likely its relative
desire to see each type of research done. This is a common
phenomenon where government agencies hold data on individuals,
said Franklin E. Zimring, professor at UC Berkeley School of Law.
"Researchers have no trouble [getting information] when [agencies]
want to give it," he said.382 But when the agency does not want to
release the information, outsiders have very few avenues for
compelling disclosure, he said.383 This is especially true in cases in
which privacy rights are at stake.384 "If you create a privacy right for
individuals, you are essentially giving a club to administrative
agencies to simply refuse," he said.385
An agency's decision to release information "can go either way,"
Zimring said, and when he sought to study the impact of California's
1994 "Three Strikes and You're Out" legislation, the decision went his
way.386 The Three Strikes law greatly enhanced punishments for
recidivists, and the Public Policy Institute of California awarded
Zimring a grant to study whether these punishments deterred repeat
offenders.387 To do the study, Zimring needed a list of arrestees and
their alleged crimes before Three Strikes, and a list of them after. In
response to his request, the state DOJ gave Zimring 3000 criminal
records, including names and other identifying information.388
Zimring says he got the information because people at state agencies
"thought it was interesting research."389 He is not always so lucky: "If
382 Interview with Franklin E. Zimring, Professor, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley Sch. of Law, in
Berkeley, Cal. (Feb. 10, 2009).
383 Interview with Franklin E. Zimring, Professor, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley Sch. of Law, in
Berkeley, Cal. (Feb. 24, 2009).
384 Id.
385 Id.
386 Id.; See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET AL., PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES
AND YOU'RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA (2001).




it's administrative discretion, you win some and you lose some and
there's no outside power."390
The vigor with which government agencies fight disclosures of
offenders' DNA profiles suggests that researchers seeking to study
them will lose an appeal to agency discretion.391 Law enforcement
agencies have an interest in secrecy392-courts analyzing DNA
database searches under the Fourth Amendment have found them to
be constitutional in part because DNA samples and profiles are not
widely accessible.393 Furthermore, countless successful convictions
rest on DNA statistics, which, if incorrect, could put those convictions
at risk. At the very least, the discovery of incorrect statistics would
bury courts in appeals and habeas corpus petitions. The state's desire
to avoid this scenario is understandable, especially if DNA statistics
turn out to be roughly but not precisely accurate. But avoidance is not
acceptable. If law enforcement continues to champion adherence,
without study, to current DNA statistics, control of the database
should transfer to an independent agency. 394 Given the incongruous
reality that newborns' DNA samples are afforded fewer protections
than offenders' profiles, the legislature should require DOJ to entrust
this research to an outside state agency or scientist, or it should
consider organizational changes that would prevent an agency with a
vested interest in today's DNA statistics from being the database's
gatekeeper.
In the meantime, judges should require government lawyers to
demonstrate that law enforcement agencies have policies in place to
allow independent statistical review of offender DNA databases.
Courts should require government agencies to show that researchers
in fact access offender profiles using those policies, and ensure that
criminal defendants have access to the database as a source of
exculpatory evidence. At the least, courts should allow defense
counsel to present evidence questioning DNA rarity statistics
390 Id.
391 See supra note 32 and surrounding text.
392 See Giannelli, supra note 276.
393 See United States v. Kriesel, 508 F.3d 941,944 (9th Cir. 2007) (pointing out the CODIS
statute's "privacy protection standards"); United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir.
2007) (noting the CODIS statute's criminal penalty for unauthorized use of offenders'
DNA).
394 NAS makes a similar recommendation. See NAS REPORT, supra note 54, at 19.
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routinely presented to juries. Without these steps, DNA evidence
should be excluded from criminal trials.
CONCLUSION
Constitutional principles require government agencies to invite
scientists to study offender DNA databases. State and federal law
allow it. Just as public health concerns drive the limited release of
newborns' genetic material, our system of justice and defendants'
constitutional rights require the same for offenders' DNA profiles.
Agencies cannot have it both ways: either the current system for
releasing genetic information to researchers is adequate for forensic
DNA profiles, or it is not adequate at all.
Ideally, statistical tests would show that current estimates as to the
rarity of DNA profiles are accurate. However, if DNA profiles are not
as rare as current statistics portray them to be, untold numbers of
convictions could be compromised. This is not a reason to allow
potentially faulty science to remain unexamined, it is a question that
demands an answer. Yet no one outside government has access to the
tools necessary to provide one. If law enforcement agencies continue
to resist scrutiny of offender DNA profiles, reasonable judges should
take action through the imperfect venue of a criminal trial. A better
solution, however, would be to release offender DNA profiles to
independent, qualified researchers applying appropriate safeguards.
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